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Abstract 
 
 My dissertation formulates a theory of first beings, or a way to more aptly 
understand human relationships with animals in Native American Literatures. It starts 
with a brief, selected history of the scholarship on animal studies. Animal studies, 
defined succinctly, is the study of our relationships with nonhuman animals. I situate 
Linda Hogan’s “First People” and John Mohawk’s “Animal Nations and their Right to 
Survive” as two exemplary texts which contribute to the field of animal studies by 
examining Native American oral traditions. I analyze two novels—Brothers Three and 
The Surrounded—using the theoretical lens of first beings. In doing so, I argue these 
two Native novels from the 1930s show how the process of colonization in North 
America affected relationships between Indigenous human and nonhuman animals. It 
did so by promoting increasingly confined methods of domestication over hunting and 
free-range practices. Noteworthy passages in each novel depict protagonists who 
question the degree of human difference from nonhuman animals and suggest 
similarities based on a shared capacity for suffering, specifically suffering caused by 
this growing degree of confinement. Domestication as such is figuratively meaningful, 
as these novels suggest, in representing Native peoples' relationships with dominant 
cultures—the colonizer domesticating the colonized.  
 I then move on to theorize how we can recognize first beings possessing 
sovereignty, or political agency. I examine the way other animals are included and 
excluded in the philosophies of two current Native political theorists: Taiaiake Alfred 
and Dale Turner. I then use John Mohawk’s “Animal Nations and their Right to 
Survive” as part of a framework to analyze how the traditional Cherokee story "Origin 
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of Disease and Medicine" can be read as recognizing the political agency of nonhuman 
animals. I follow by examining how a recent political document of the Cherokee Nation 
of Oklahoma continues to recognize nonhuman sovereignty. Finally, I conclude that we 
should be aware of how other animals possess sovereignty by means of our recognition 
of their suffering, specifically the agency within political discourses to avoid that 
suffering.
  
1 
 
Introduction: Ji-s-du (Rabbit)
My maternal great-great grandfather, Louis Crutchfield, was raised on the 
family’s allotment in Inola, Oklahoma, a small town about an hour northwest of 
Tahlequah, the capital of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. My mother would tell 
stories about Grandpa Lou (that is what she called him) while I was growing up. One of 
the stories I remember most vividly was about hunting rabbits. Grandpa Lou had 
described to my mother a time when hunters came to the area from a large city (most 
likely Tulsa). These hunters appeared to have spared little expense in purchasing their 
hunting gear, in brandishing expensive guns and wearing nice, brand-new hunting 
clothes. Their apparel and choice of firearms were not the only things that distinguished 
them from those who hunted locally, however. Instead of killing the rabbits for food or 
their hides, these hunters killed the rabbits solely for sport, returning to the city having 
left the bodies of hundreds of rabbits hanging in the trees. My mother said that this 
incident seemed to bother my grandfather deeply. 
I can only guess at the reason for Grandpa Lou’s unease at the actions of those 
hunters from the city who killed for mere sport. He died before I was born, and I only 
know him through stories. I can imagine, though, that one reason this type of hunting 
for sport may have bothered him was that he had lived through the Great Depression 
and wastefulness, after having experienced such poverty, would be an unforgivable sin 
in Grandpa Lou’s eyes. Another likely reason the event was so disturbing was because 
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what the hunters had done—killing animals in such great numbers and with such 
disrespect—was so dramatically opposed to Cherokee values.1  
The story also continued to disturb me. To gain more insight into how my great-
great grandfather understood this event, I asked my maternal grandmother (Lou’s 
granddaughter) about the incident. She said that she had never even heard the story 
before. It is possible, therefore, that the story Grandpa Lou told may or may not have 
actually happened, although it is plausible, given the popularity of hunting for sport in 
Oklahoma. Perhaps Grandpa Lou recounted the story to my mother as a way to pass 
down a good way to live our lives in relation to other living beings. Whether the 
incident happened or not, the idea that it is abhorrent to kill a living being or cause an 
animal to suffer for no good reason is a value that has been passed down in my family 
through similar tales. Stories like this one, that teach respect for other living beings, are 
common among many tribes, including Cherokee. 
Grandpa Lou’s story has been at the forefront of my mind throughout the 
entirety of this project. My intellectual pursuit for the past seven or so years has been to 
study the many ways we might understand human relationships with nonhuman 
animals. One of the most intriguing possibilities is that other animals can help us 
understand these relationships through a nonhuman agency that is only now being 
recognized in the interdisciplinary field of animal studies. As I explain in Chapter One, 
the protagonists of Native American Renaissance literature are depicted by Peter 
Beidler and LaVonne Ruoff as needing to understand other animals in order to develop 
an understanding of themselves as human beings. As both a Native American and 
                                                 
1
 I develop these themes of disrespect, hunting, and Cherokee values in developed in 
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theorist of Native literature, I have, in effect, been doing the same thing as those 
protagonists. In this study, I hope to attune myself to the “world of animals” insofar as 
my analysis takes their possible agency and interests into account (Beidler 133). I also 
hope to begin to understand the significance of other animals as depicted in Native 
literatures in ways that do not end with human interests. 
To begin my inquiry, I start in Chapter One by examining criticism of how 
Indigenous literature of the Native American Literary Renaissance relates to other 
species. I then give an overview of the field of animal studies and examples of the few 
instances in which the field references Native American cultures. I end by examining a 
persistent conflict between analytic and continental philosophical approaches to animal 
studies. I posit the concept of first beings as a way to move forward with particular 
analyses of our relationships with nonhuman animals in American Indian cultures.  
I then look back in Chapter Two to pre-Native American Literary Renaissance 
literature to examine how relationships with animals and political relationships 
intertwine. I analyze two novels—Brothers Three and The Surrounded—from the 
standpoint of first beings. In doing so, I argue that the two portray a concern over the 
increasing degree of domestication between humans and other animals. As this concern 
with domestication increases within the novels, each work is focused less on our 
differences from nonhuman animals and more on our shared capacity for suffering, 
specifically suffering caused by a growing degree of confinement. Domestication is not 
only appropriate to literally describe the intensification of the already-intermeshed 
relationships between Native Americans and nonhuman animals, but also stands in 
                                                                                                                                               
Chapter Three.   
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figuratively for Native peoples’ relationships with dominant culture—the colonizer 
domesticating the colonized. Brothers Three (1935), by John Milton Oskison, is a 
frontier romance about three generations of Cherokees on a cattle ranch in which most 
of the interactions with nonhuman animals are depicted, unsurprisingly, in terms of 
domesticating horses for work animals or cattle for use as food. D’Arcy McNickle’s 
1936 novel The Surrounded depicts in very stark terms, as I will show, the 
interconnected problems of assimilation and nonhuman animal domestication through 
the colonial strategy of confinement. 
I extend the political critique of confinement in Chapter Three by theorizing 
how we can recognize first beings possessing sovereignty, or formulations of political 
agency. In We Talk, You Listen, Sioux critic Vine Deloria defines sovereignty first and 
foremost as a process. Deloria insightfully writes that "implicit in the sufferings of each 
group is the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the group" (117). If we take 
Deloria's assertion in the direction of animal ethics, our recognition of animals' ability 
to suffer leads to an ethical obligation to recognize their sovereignty. Our obligation to 
nonhuman animals is also one of the constraints on our own sovereignty. In exploring 
sovereignty, or political agency, in relation to animals, I start with an extended 
discussion of John Mohawk’s “Animal Nations and their Right to Survive.” I then move 
to examine the way first beings are included and excluded in the philosophies of two 
current Native political theorists: Taiaiake Alfred and Dale Turner. I use this framework 
to analyze how the traditional Cherokee story "Origin of Disease and Medicine" can be 
read as recognizing the political agency of nonhuman animals. Finally, I conclude that 
we should be aware of how first beings possess sovereignty in our recognition of their 
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suffering, specifically the agency within political discourses to avoid that suffering. 
  
6 
  
Chapter One: Toward a Definition of First Beings 
 Narratives concerning the relationships between Indigenous humans and other 
species are ubiquitous in American Indian literatures. These narratives can be found in 
everything from oral literatures to Indigenous science fiction.
2
 Cherokee writer William 
Sanders provides an excellent example of the latter in his short story “At Ten Wolf 
Lake.” This story is set in a world where mythical creatures, such as Sasquatch, abound. 
While I use the term Sasquatch to describe these beings, it is not quite accurate with 
regard to the story. Sasquatch refers to a similar but separate group of beings in 
Sanders’s speculative world. The term Hominid American is too politically correct and 
awkward, according to the story’s protagonist. Instead, most beings of this type prefer 
“Homin or Hom” (Sanders 414). In an episode of the story, we meet a Hom named 
Charley who belongs to a militant Hom activist group. Sitting beside him in a truck is 
an Indian man who belongs to a politically analogous human group. A bumper sticker 
on Charley’s truck reads “FIRST BEINGS POWER” with the image of a clenched hairy 
fist beside it (424). The appearance of the provocative sticker in this short story 
signifies the possibility that agency (in this case, political agency) is not limited to the 
human species.
3
  
Although seemingly a novel notion, many Native philosophies do not define 
humans as categorically different from or superior to nonhuman animals. The concepts 
of categorical difference and exceptional humanity have, however, been integral to 
                                                 
2
 For an insightful introduction to this genre see Grace Dillon. Her section on 
“Indigenous Science and Sustainability” is particularly relevant. 
3
 For a good introductory exploration of nonhuman agency see Sarah E. McFarland and 
Ryan Hediger. 
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many of the dominant narratives that inform colonial ideologies. Historically, these 
invading ideologies have ignored the political agency of other species. American Indian 
literatures are often treated briefly in scholarship regarding relationships with other 
animals, but they are ideal for animal studies scholarship, which can in turn benefit 
Native studies by helping us investigate our relationships with other animals. 
In this study, I propose an ontological shift, what I am calling first beings, to 
signify the lack of a categorical difference between humans and nonhuman animals in 
the dominant narratives of many Native cultures. I propose the use of this ontological 
narrative to more accurately describe the ways in which Indigenous traditions and 
literatures often define indigeneity as extending beyond the human species. A narrative 
of first beings provides more accuracy in terms of traditional and contemporary 
literatures, but also serves as a strategic way to struggle against political narratives that 
serve the ends of colonial oppression. As I will argue throughout this study, Native 
American peoples and nonhuman animals face similar methods of oppression, 
specifically, tactics of oppression by means of confinement. This takes the form of 
literal confinement, such as reservations, that are exponentially smaller than original 
tribal homelands, and fenced-in herds of domesticated animals. Confinement is driven 
by the political tactics of removal and allotment. These tactics also take the form of 
figurative confinement, such as the limitation to an anthropocentric ontological 
narrative which draws a solid line between humans and everything else. This line limits 
the many ways in which Native peoples see ourselves as connected to the nonhuman 
world. My proposal to use the language of first beings is in critique of the dominant 
narrative of human exceptionalism that reduces the political agency of not only 
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nonhumans, but Indigenous human cultures, too.  
The narrative of first beings is more productively articulated as a standpoint that 
affords more agency via ontological status to nonhuman animals and therefore more 
agency to Indigenous humans who have narrated the importance of our relationships 
with—including our obligations to—other animals since time immemorial. Standpoint 
theory, as Josephine Donovan explains, is a useful way of theorizing our obligations to 
nonhuman animals. She writes that standpoint theory originated with the work of 
Marxist theorist Georg Lukacs, who conceptualized the working-class subject as having 
a unique epistemology in relation to capitalism and commodification. Donovan further 
explains how feminist theorists have borrowed from Lukacs to develop feminist 
standpoint theories. Donovan develops what she terms “animal standpoint” to 
complement feminist care theory which, when applied to nonhuman animals, requires 
“listening to animals, paying emotional attention, taking seriously—caring about—what 
they are telling us” (emphasis in original 305). As will be evident in my readings of 
Native novels from the mid 1930s, emotional investment by the protagonists in terms of 
emotional capacity for nonhuman animals is best read from a standpoint similar to the 
one that Donovan articulates. Such an approach, as Donovan explains, is a more 
promising mode of analysis than logocentric calculations, the discourse of rights, or the 
quantification of utilitarianism.  
Donovan concedes the main problem with theorizing a standpoint for nonhuman 
animals is determining how their “viewpoint is to be articulated” (320). None of our 
speculation about nonhuman animals can escape being human-centered. Even with this 
caveat, standpoint theory leaves space for how the interests of nonhuman animals are 
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interpreted by various cultures. A culturally-understood, inter-tribal conception of the 
intellect, emotional capacity, and social codes of nonhuman animals is what I am 
gesturing towards when I refer to the standpoint of first beings. Another integral 
consideration of this incipient concept is how these particular Indigenous texts 
recognize the interests of other species as co-constituent with our own interests as 
Indigenous peoples. In considering how indigeneity exists beyond humanity, we should 
realize that we can only understand other species through an understanding of ourselves 
as humans and only understand ourselves as humans in relation to other species. 
 Here I am using the term other animals synonymously with what many animal 
studies scholars label nonhuman animals. Richard D. Ryder finds the term nonhuman 
problematic because it assumes the human as the normal example of a species (2). 
However, the term nonhuman is helpful in signaling animal as a problematic signifier 
while simultaneously implying the need for more precise language (such as 
distinguishing by species). I will use the terms other, nonhuman, and first beings 
somewhat interchangeably when referring to those who are commonly labeled as 
animals. The term first beings, however, signals the possibility of shared indigeneity 
between human and nonhuman animals. First beings signals a lack of the categorical 
difference in the ontological status of humans and other animals in many Native 
American narratives. 
 While focused on terminology, it is important here also to define what is meant 
by the term Indigenous. I am using it primarily as it relates to a strategic understanding 
of Native peoples vis-à-vis political oppression. It may seem ironic that the concept of 
indigeneity has not always been around. Ronald Niezen explains that the term has 
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“proliferated since the 1980’s” (3). He writes that “reinvigorated traditional values and 
world views are identified as Indigenous, as having always existed” (12). Niezen goes 
on to explain that “Indigenous history is ‘invented’ in different ways than are the 
narratives of large ethnic groups or nation-states” (10). He continues by explaining that 
the term Indigenous has been defined by situations external to Native cultures. 
Indigeneity became the focus of Native leaders who recognized the need for a 
framework for creating and maintaining international political alliances with other 
Native nations who were struggling with colonial occupation. By showing how the 
concept of indigeneity is socially constructed while providing its history, Niezen does 
not devalue its importance. Instead, he acknowledges the need for tribal nations to adopt 
a strategic language for gaining political agency in organizations such as the United 
Nations. This strategic construction is used to combat the continuing and destructive 
results of colonial oppression.   
 The term Indigenous is useful in not only gaining political agency for Native 
peoples, but for the many nonhuman animals with whom Native cultures have ancient 
relationships. In Red on Red, Craig Womack (Creek/Cherokee) explains that our 
cultures are carried though narratives that articulate our own agency. He asserts that "we 
are not mere victims, but active agents in history, innovators of new ways, of Indian 
ways, of thinking and being and speaking and authoring in this world created by 
colonial contact" (6). It is as "active agents" that we author our concepts of indigeneity 
and sovereignty, and it is also as active agents that we recognize the indigeneity and 
sovereignty of other people and other species. In exploring the specifics of how we, as 
Indigenous peoples, interact with nonhuman animals, it is necessary to revise static 
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notions of indigeneity and sovereignty. Much later in his influential book, Womack 
asks, among other questions, if Native literature should "be a means of exploring more 
radical approaches to sovereignty?" He then answers himself with "a resounding 'yes'."  
(149). I would add that as active agents we also should recognize the so-called radical 
approaches to indigeneity that include our relationships with nonhuman animals.  
Before exploring further the line of inquiry that I refer to as the standpoint of 
first beings—how Indigenous peoples narrate our relationships with other animals—it 
would be helpful to situate it in the broader field of animal studies. Animal studies as a 
field of inquiry is about our complex relationships with nonhuman animals. In writing 
about our relationships with other animals, Peter Singer utilizes the term speciesism—
which Ryder coined via pamphlets at Oxford in 1970—for his book Animal Liberation 
(1975). Singer defines speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the 
interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other 
species” (6). He explains that what is needed to combat speciesist systems of thought is 
for us to give “equal consideration” to the interests of other animals (2). In his inclusion 
of beings outside humanity, Singer follows Jeremy Bentham’s assertion that when 
thinking about the differences between humans and other species, “[t]he question is not, 
Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (311). Redirecting the 
comparison between humans and nonhumans to the question of suffering forces the 
discourse into accounting for the ethical logics, or lack thereof, of our complex 
relationships with other animals.
4
 It recognizes nonhuman animals as beings whose 
interests deserve “equal consideration” in any rational and systematically equitable 
                                                 
4
 There are other ways than a focus on suffering to include nonhuman animals in ethical 
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theory of ethics. Following Bentham, Singer persuasively argues that avoiding suffering 
is clearly an interest of all sentient animals. A principle of equal consideration brings 
academic and philosophical traditions more closely in line with Indigenous ways of 
thinking about our relationships with other animals.
5
 
In thinking about how nonhuman animals are portrayed in Native literatures, I 
want to avoid focusing solely on the differences between Indian stories and non-Native 
narratives about nonhuman animals. Focusing merely on differences risks the 
possibility of homogenizing many distinct tribal cultures. We also run the risk of 
romanticizing Indigenous relationships with other animals.
6
 Worse still, it might lead to 
unwittingly reify readings that can be seen as subscribing to notions of savagery (the 
Indian as animalistic). Therefore, it is important to note that the ethical and ontological 
inclusion of other animals is not absent before the mid-1970s, nor is it restricted to tribal 
cultures. As Norm Phelps shows, as early as 496 B.C., Pythagoras and his followers 
argued against killing nonhuman animals on the basis that they had souls. As Phelps 
further explains, the practice of Jainism in India—advocating nonviolence to all living 
beings—may have existed as far back as the ninth century B.C. (19). However, these 
older examples of narratives that give “equal consideration” to nonhuman animals have 
been unsuccessfully competing with the dominant narratives of their difference and 
inferiority. Dominant speciesist narratives were firmly entrenched in philosophical and 
scientific discourses by the time that Charles Darwin provocatively wrote that “the 
                                                                                                                                               
considerations. For instance, see Martha Nussbaum on an ethic of flourishing. 
5
 Hastings Shade (Cherokee) explains that “the dog chose the Indian,” and so we should 
treat him or her “with respect” (Teuton et al. 139). 
6
 One of the most pervasive examples of this romantic relationship is between Disney’s 
Pocahontas and Meeko the raccoon. 
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mental faculties of man and the lower animals do not differ in kind, although 
immensely in degree” (149). Even before Darwin, the categorical difference of humans 
was not a fixed notion for all in the scientific community. In The Open: Man and 
Animal, Giorgio Agamben describes how as early as the eighteenth century, Carolus 
Linnaeus, the father of modern taxonomies, was reluctant to list criteria delineating 
Homo sapiens from other closely related species. Linnaeus wrote that he “hardly knows 
of a distinguishing mark that separates man from the apes” (as cited in Agamben 24). In 
place of a categorical distinction for all of humanity, Linnaeus writes “nosce te ipsum,” 
or “know thyself.” Agamben derives from Linnaeus that the only way humans are 
categorically different from other sentient creatures is that we narrate ourselves as such, 
an idea aligned with many Indigenous narratives. 
 Like Agamben, in the last ten years or so, theorists who are often labeled as 
poststructuralists have started questioning how “immensely in degree” we really differ 
from other animals. Two of the late Jacques Derrida’s books, having been published 
posthumously from lectures given in the late 1990s and early 2000s, take the proposed 
large degree of difference into close consideration—The Animal That Therefore I Am 
and The Beast and the Sovereign I & II. In the former, Derrida questions the 
human/animal binary that he explains is present throughout the canon of continental 
philosophy from Rene Descartes’s assertion of other animals as “automata” to Martin 
Heidegger’s insistence that they are “poor in world” (54, 79). In these books, Derrida 
traces the prevalence of animality in the narratives of European political sovereignty. 
Another theorist, Donna J. Haraway, also provides tools of inquiry into the topic of our 
relationships with other animals in When Species Meet. She does this through her 
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exploration of “companion species” with whom she argues humans and nonhumans 
share a symbiotic relationship. Haraway denies the common misconception that humans 
are on the “opposite side of the Great Divide” from other species (11). Her rebuttal to 
this popular notion, given her concept of companion species, is that humanity is a 
“spatial and temporal web of interspecies dependencies” (11). What can be seen from 
these poststructuralist theorists, in agreement with Linnaeus, is that our concepts of 
humanity and animality are contingent on how we narrate the relationships between 
ourselves and nonhuman animals—narrative acts that are performed in complex and 
conflicting ways. 
 Derrida and Haraway have also touched on, though rather briefly, Indigenous 
narratives concerning our complex relationships with nonhuman animals. In the first 
volume of The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida explains the cultural relativity of our 
concepts of nonhuman animals by using the example of the wolf. Derrida writes that 
“real wolves cross humankind’s national and institutional frontiers, and his sovereign 
nation-states” (23). He then follows by elucidating that “the figures of the wolf belong 
to cultures, nations, languages, myths, fables, fantasies, histories” (24). Derrida briefly 
mentions Native American cultures with a version of an Anishinaabeg story in which 
Manabozho’s “next of kin is the wolf ” (29). Haraway spends a bit more time on 
Indigenous culture by examining the importance of sheep and herding dogs to Navajo 
history and politics (98–100). It is fitting that these theorists have wandered over toward 
Native cultures—if only briefly—in their investigations of the relationships between 
human and nonhuman animals. In many tribal traditions difference between humans and 
other animals, while certainly present, is less dominant. This type of interrelationship is 
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not exclusive to Native cultures, as the previous short history of animal studies 
illustrates. However, in regard to other species, interconnectedness and inclusion appear 
broadly in oral traditions as well as in Indigenous philosophies, spiritual practices, and 
literatures. In many of these, texts there is a dominant narrative that suggests other 
animals share indigeneity with us. 
 Early studies of nonhuman animals in contemporary Native literature focus on 
their importance to human characters. In his short study on foundational texts of the 
Native American Literary Renaissance, Peter Beidler argues that thinking about animals 
leads the protagonists of Native novels along a path toward “emotional development” 
(139). He analyzes three novels: N. Scott Momaday’s (Kiowa/Cherokee) House Made 
of Dawn, James Welch’s (Blackfeet/Gros Ventres) Winter in the Blood, and Leslie 
Marmon Silko’s (Laguna Pueblo) Ceremony. Beidler explains that in each of these 
novels the protagonist is a “young Indian, disoriented by prolonged contact with the 
world of the white man, who finds his way back from confusion to right thinking by 
attuning himself with the world of animals” (133). Beidler’s interpretation of the role 
animals play in these novels privileges the meaning that they hold for the human 
protagonists. The interests of these animals is only a distant concern in Beidler’s 
analysis.  
 The most succinct example of Beidler’s humanistic reading is where he 
recounts the episode in Welch’s Winter in the Blood, in which the unnamed protagonist 
fails to save a cow. Beidler claims that “it does not matter that the cow dies,” but rather 
that the protagonist “has tried” (143). It is interesting to note that in the recent film 
adaptation of Winter in the Blood, the cow survives, suggesting avoiding representing 
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the cow’s death in film does matter. Likewise, A. Lavonne Ruoff argues that the 
closeness that the nameless protagonist of Winter in the Blood feels to his father and 
brother "contrasts with the distance he feels from the females in the novel—human and 
animal" (108). She continues to explain that the narrator’s chores of taking care of the 
cow and her calf "provide an opportunity to feel concern and commitment for 
something other than himself and thus provide a transitional state to the development of 
these feelings for humans" (120). Both Beidler and Ruoff suggest that the treatment of 
animals is an indirect way for the narrator to learn proper behavior toward humans. 
This focus of these critics on the human meaning of nonhuman animals is 
congruent with how Thomas Aquinas and, subsequently, Immanuel Kant claimed we 
only hold indirect ethical obligations to nonhuman animals. Aquinas explained that 
cruelty to nonhuman animals is important because it might lead one to “become cruel to 
human beings” (9). He based this reasoning on human beings’ similarity to a “principal 
agent” who has control over his or her actions through the use of reason. Conversely, 
nonhuman animals are “like instruments” in Aquinas’s schema who lack reason and 
therefore are meant to be used by humans (6-7). Kant likewise claimed our duties to 
other animals are only “indirect duties toward humanity” (23). It is this philosophical 
tradition in relation to other animals that leads Beidler to claim that it “does not matter 
that the cow dies,” but instead to focus on the humanity of the protagonist. This line of 
reasoning posits that we only have obligations to nonhuman animals insofar as they 
influence our ethics toward other humans and it denies the possibility of “principal 
agents” who do not belong to the human species. My proposal of first beings confronts 
the limitation of agency to humanity and acknowledges the active agency of many 
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nonhuman species. 
In particular, Beidler’s reasoning regarding the importance of animals is also 
contradictory: the protagonist needs to listen to other animals for his development, but 
that their death does not “matter.” His contradiction rests on the premise that human 
interests are always privileged over and against the interests of other animals. Ruoff 
leaves room in her analysis of Winter in the Blood to think in less humanistic terms than 
Beidler. She writes that "animals, such as the mare and her colt, which the narrator sees 
as the novel opens, seem to care more for their young than do humans" (120). Despite 
the anthropocentric thrust of their arguments, Beidler and Ruoff are ahead of most 
literary criticism of their time in suggesting the protagonist (and critic) needs to pay 
attention to the significance of nonhuman animals as being more than a figurative 
device. Beidler and Ruoff approach the possibility of the agency of animals, for the 
most part, because of the content of the Native novels they analyze. Their studies shows 
us how other animals are an important, but understudied aspect of Native literatures.  
 The figurative and literal usage of nonhuman animals that belong to Native 
nations, and more specifically, to the literatures of these nations, is my focus in 
formulating a standpoint of first beings. Therefore, it is important that I also qualify that 
my use of the term interests when referring to how the concerns of various species are 
constructed through Native literature and thereby the cultures of Native nations. As 
Stuart Hall, one of the founders of the school of British cultural studies concisely 
explains, “interests are not given but always have to be politically and ideologically 
constructed” (167). Hall credits Marxist critic Antonio Gramsci with being first to come 
to this realization. Cary Wolfe is critical of extending the humanistic philosophy of 
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Peter Singer, among others, to our understanding of nonhuman animals. He writes that 
Singer’s term interests in the utilitarian sense is antithetical to continental approaches 
because, as Derrida suggests, it unfolds like the “automata” that Descartes proposed 
nonhumans to be (69-70). Using the term interests to explain the interiority of beings 
outside the human species is tentative at best. However, I find that the word interest is 
useful shorthand for culturally mediated understandings of the intellect, emotions, and 
social codes of nonhuman species. These nonhuman interests, or the wellbeing and 
survival of other species, overlap with the cultural and, most importantly, the political 
discourses of Native American peoples. The understanding that nonhuman animals 
possess intellect and emotions, which have often been derided as mere 
anthropomorphism, are gaining credibility within scientific discourses.
7
 My point is in 
using the term interests I do not claim to be imposing the anthropocentric humanism 
(more specifically a utilitarianism solution) on nonhuman animals (although some type 
of anthropocentrism is always inescapable), but I am instead looking for common 
interests in the subject positions of both nonhuman animals and Native American 
peoples in relation to political discourse through the narrative of first beings. 
 Understanding the possible common interests between Native humans and other 
species—that is, first beings—allows us to understand how animals operate in Native 
literatures without reverting to an exclusionary human-centered philosophical tradition. 
In a reading of The Surrounded, in Chapter Two, for example, animals count as both 
racial allegory (the protagonist representing American Indian humans as oppressed and 
therefore a focus on racism) and they also count literally (the protagonist representing 
                                                 
7
 On morality in several species including wolves, for instance, see Bekoff and Pierce. 
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nonhuman animals as oppressed and therefore speciesism). Both of these readings, I 
argue, operate simultaneously. The way these two interpretations operate in tandem, I 
also argue, suggests that indigeneity is shared between us and nonhuman animals. 
Furthermore, the way our figurative and literal readings do not exclude each other 
suggests the promise of collective political agency (human and nonhuman) responding 
to the politics of colonial oppression.  
 Philosophical inquiries into our relationships with nonhuman animals diverge 
particularly on the point of interests between analytic and continental traditions. 
However, Peter Singer (analytic) and Jacques Derrida (continental) have both argued 
that speciesism is analogous to other logics of oppression. The fact that these two 
philosophers make such similar points from two different, and often antagonistic, 
philosophical traditions—analytic and continental respectively—makes a strong case 
for our extension of this logic to our formulation of first beings. In Animal Liberation, 
Singer writes: 
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the 
interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between 
their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate 
the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. 
Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override 
the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical. 
(9)  
 
Similarly, in an interview, Derrida uses the term carnophallologocentrism to append the 
normalization of eating and assimilating of the nonhuman other that is prevalent in 
Western philosophy (“An Interview with”). He adds this to the normalization of the 
widespread privileging of masculinity and reason. We can see that, like Singer, Derrida 
is connecting the privileging of eating animals, or carno (or we might say the 
  
20 
normalization of speciesism), with the privileging of masculinity or phallo (or we might 
say the normalization of sexism) along with a very Euro-centric version of reason (or 
we might say the normalization of racism). Derrida is making a different point than 
Singer because he is focused on exposing the foundations of Western philosophy rather 
than proposing solutions per se, but the structures of oppression and inequality are quite 
similar in both philosophers’ analyses.  
 Beyond suggesting a principle of equal consideration (Singer’s solution), 
Derrida asserts that not only is our consumption of nonhuman animals both literal and 
figurative, but that there is a connection between these modes. He says that "what is 
radically alien in the other doesn’t have a chance—it will be digested, melted down in 
the great tradition, wolfed down mercilessly" (“An Interview with”) This takes the form 
of literal digestion in the case of nonhuman animals and assimilation in the case of 
Native Americans. One way to react against these oppressive systems (speciesism and 
racism), Derrida points out, is to concede that radical otherness should not be digested 
or understood fully. Just as the nonhuman is not digested (or understood intellectually 
by humans) our understanding of the agency of other beings cannot be fully understood. 
We can, however, make sense of it in relation to our own agency as Native peoples of 
several, distinct tribal nations. What Derrida does in his critique of the construction of 
nonhuman animal in Western philosophy is provide an opening for other ways of 
understanding interspecies relationships that come from separate ontological origins, 
like those of Native cultures. 
 To understand how the differing ontologies of native nations conceptualize 
nonhuman animals in a political sense, we should examine traditional narratives that 
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include other species. Linda Hogan’s (Chickasaw) “First People” provides an excellent 
place to start inquiring about our relationships with nonhuman animals in oral literatures 
of Native cultures. Hogan refers to other animals as “first people.” She gets this 
phrasing from a translation of a Karok story in which a magical species, Ikxareyavs 
(translated as first people), inhabits the earth. She argues that many Indigenous 
traditions place nonhuman animals as the first beings created. As an example, Hogan 
recounts an Iroquois story about other animals being the primary inhabitants. She 
writes, “in the beginning, according to an Iroquois creation account, the only people in 
the world were nonhuman animals. When a divine woman fell from the sky, the animals 
saved her from drowning” (8). Nonhuman animals not only were here first, but also 
were responsible for human existence. Hogan writes, “According to the people who are 
from the oldest traditions, the relationship between the animal people and the humans is 
one of the most significance. And this relationship is defined in story. Story is a power 
that describes our world, our human being, sets out the rules and intricate laws of 
human beings in relationship with all the rest” (9). While proclaiming that how we talk 
(and write) about the world has concrete effects, she simultaneously enacts this power 
by referring to our stories of other animals as the “oldest traditions.” Stories about 
nonhuman animals as “first people” not only are traditional, but are also the earliest of 
traditional narratives.  
 Hogan offers a careful articulation of the lack of categorical difference between 
humans and nonhuman animals in traditional oral literature. She recounts how other 
animals are represented broadly in Indigenous cultures through the “constellation of 
stories, songs, and ceremonies” (10). Hogan argues that “at some times, in some ways, 
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there was no line between the species” (8). Her assertion of species difference, although 
carefully qualified, has at the same time radical implications. Hogan claims there was 
“no line” with the qualifier that the blur is contingent on particular times and ways. It is 
also interesting that she uses the past tense, “was no line.” We might take this to mean 
that a clear line now separates humans and other animals in all instances, whereas there 
was none before. However, this would hinge on the idea of a precontact paradise, which 
is something that Taiaiake Alfred (Haudenosaunee), among others, warns us against.
8
 
One way to productively follow Hogan’s reasoning is to carefully historicize our 
analyses of specific texts about nonhuman animals. In conceptualizing a standpoint of 
first beings, it is necessary to be mindful of the many different distinctions between us 
and other animals that are contingent on historical and local circumstances. 
 Hogan explains how traditional stories often recognized the political agency of 
nonhuman animals. She describes how holding treaties with other animals is a long-held 
belief. The existence of such treaties implicitly recognizes nonhuman political agency. 
One of the most common ways these treaties between humans and nonhuman animals 
are narrated is that other animals willingly give their lives for human nourishment as 
long as respect is maintained for the species through religious and ecological practices. 
Many different tribes, Hogan explains, maintain these types of treaties. She writes: 
That we held, and still hold, treaties with the animals and plant species is a 
known part of tribal culture. The relationship between human people and 
animals is still alive and resonant in the world, the ancient tellings carried on by 
a constellation of stories, songs, and ceremonies, all shaped by lived knowledge 
of the world and its many interwoven, unending relationships. These stories and 
ceremonies keep open the bridge between one kind of intelligence and another, 
one species and another.  
                                                 
8
 Taiaiake Alfred explains that “in lamenting the loss of a traditional frame of reference, 
we must be careful not to romanticize the past” (53). 
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 (italics in original, 10) 
 
I quote this passage at length because of the importance it has on how we discuss our 
relationships with other animals and the political implications of that discussion. Hogan 
chooses to use human as an adjective “human people and animals,” consistent with her 
use of the word people to apply to other animals. By using the word people, she is 
placing nonhumans squarely within political discourse. This recognition of sameness, 
Hogan shows, is important for how we maintain treaties with others animals and 
recognize their agency. It is important to note Hogan’s assertion that while relationships 
exist, they are also complex and diffuse. She characterizes them as many, interwoven, 
and unending. This complexity calls for careful scholarship concerning our 
relationships with other animals. 
John Mohawk (Seneca), along with Hogan, examines the importance of our 
relationships with nonhuman animals in terms of political discourse.
9
 Mohawk makes 
clear the oppressive and destructive effects of colonial ideologies on first beings. As 
Daniel Wildcat (Creek) explains, Mohawk is showing in this article how “the 
metaphysics of progress presents itself as the greatest threat to the future biology of the 
planet" (433). Mohawk starts off with an anecdote. He explains how Oren Lyons 
(Seneca) flatly states to the United Nations in 1977 "We see no seat at the U.N. for the 
eagle [...] No seat for the whales, no representation for the animals" (as cited in 
Mohawk). Mohawk blames what he calls “Economic Man” echoing back the derogatory 
language of primitivism that pervaded academia in the earlier half of the twentieth 
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 I am grateful for both the funding for research and the guidance of the director 
provided by the Sequoyah National Research Center. It was there that I found John 
Mohawk’s article titled “Animal Nations and their Right to Survive.” 
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century and which continues to remain in less explicit, but more insidious ways. For 
Mohawk, “Economic Man” is ideologically driven to monetize nature. This ideology is 
what leads large companies (and the countries that support them) to ignore tribal 
interests. Mohawk wrote this in the late eighties, but it is just as relevant today (perhaps 
more so) with the militant action taken against Native protesters who are concerned 
with protecting the environment, as can be seen in the Idle No More movement. In his 
critique of Economic Man, and following Lyons, Mohawk uses the political language of 
rights in regard to species of animals, or animal nations. He mentions only briefly our 
relationships with animals on an individual basis. What I see Mohawk doing here is 
using traditional understandings of our relationships with animals to moderate the 
immense disrespect Economic Man practices toward nature (including other humans, 
for that matter, who do not share a zeal for the dogmatic narratives of progress). 
Mohawk is concerned with protecting the environment we share with animals and uses 
the political language of rights to champion endangered species. Hogan and Mohawk 
are just two of the scholars whom I am following in thinking about how we tell stories 
about animals and the effects our stories have on our relationships with them and among 
ourselves. 
 In distinction to Hogan’s language of people, I propose we should begin our 
study of nonhuman animals as “first beings” rather than “first people.” This will, as 
explained earlier, give us an opportunity to theorize how certain texts recognize the 
agency (or lack thereof) of other animals in Native political and other discourses. This 
line of inquiry may also lead to different understandings of what it means to be 
Indigenous. It has the potential for developing formulations of sovereignty that include 
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other animals. An inclusion of nonhuman animals leads the discussion toward the 
possibility of other types of Indigenous posthumanism.
10
 My study is similar to how 
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, in studying how we relate to nonhuman animals, 
attempt to “shift the debate about animals from an issue in applied ethics to a question 
of political theory” (22). Furthermore, it is my hope that this study begins a discussion 
of how Native literatures have always articulated a standpoint of first beings and how 
specific Native nations have developed political conceptions of what it means to be 
human in relation other animals.  
We can start understanding Native literatures in more than merely humanistic 
terms. Instead of following the proclamations of Aquinas (and Aristotle before him) that 
animals cannot be active agents, we should be cognizant of how our oral traditions have 
always represented such agency. In doing so, we can understand how analyzing the 
intersection of our political interests as Indigenous peoples and the interests of 
nonhuman animals can provide us tools to work against colonial oppression. By 
understanding ourselves as first beings, we may have a narrative that allows us more 
agency in critiquing and overcoming confining dominant federal tactics of confinement. 
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 For a thorough discussion on posthumanism see Cary Wolfe’s Posthumanism. For an 
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Chapter Two: Domesticated Species in D’Arcy McNickle’s The Surrounded 
and John M. Oskison’s Brothers Three 
 
Racist attitudes that popularly constructed Indians as savages were prominent in 
public consciousness in the early 20
th
 century, even though federal policy had shifted 
from military maneuvers to paternalistic practices ostensibly designed to “help” Indians 
become productive individuals in American society. These changes in ideological and 
practical tactics were among many that contributed to the weakening of the power of 
sovereign tribal governments. Chief Justice John Marshall, who delimited Native 
sovereign tribes as “domestic, dependent nations” in the early 1830s, manifested the 
direct, legal codification of this paternalism.
11
 It was Marshall’s definition that legally 
“domesticated” Native nations and helped ensure that they would not have a secure 
foothold within the paternalistic political landscape for another century.  
It is not surprising that nonhuman animal domestication—the taming and 
subjugation of other animals for human use—was used figuratively during debates 
centered on U.S. Native political issues during this time. It may prove more surprising 
that, in the earlier half of the 20
th
 century, Indians and our allies also used nonhuman 
animal domestication to figuratively represent opposition to these paternalistic 
practices. These figurative depictions of other animals as Indians are sympathetically 
dramatized in early Native novels. There are certain passages, however, that require 
literal analysis; that is, other animals representing actual members of nonhuman species. 
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 This language was used to define tribal nations in Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia 
(1831) and Worchester vs. Georgia (1832). It was intended to strengthen Cherokee land 
claims by rejecting American claims of discovery. It is, however, how Native nations 
have been defined since as a guardian/ward relationship (Wilkins and Lomawaima 61). 
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But we can read these texts without reducing their meanings to depend upon either a 
figurative or a literal reading. In doing so, we can understand ourselves as first beings 
and can approach texts depicting nonhuman animals in a more nuanced manner.
12
 
Additionally, by analyzing the narratives by Native peoples about ourselves and other 
animals (and the ways in which these narratives overlap) we can understand how 
detrimental federal ideologies and policies adversely affect more than just the human 
species.  
First beings, as has been suggested previously, is a conceptual category that 
attributes indigeneity to more than just the human species.
13
 As John Mohawk reminds 
us, dominant Native ways of understanding our place in the world often avoid making 
the dogmatic categorical distinction between human and nonhuman.
14
 My intent in this 
chapter is to continue to invalidate those racist notions of Indians as savage animals 
while honoring Native epistemologies that do not categorically separate the human 
species from all the rest. I pursue this line of inquiry with the hope that it will 
persuasively illustrate how Native literatures provide a more balanced understanding of 
the relationships between human and nonhuman animals. I also hope it will allow 
readers to recognize, without reverting to romantic nostalgia, how those relationships 
have been compromised by assimilative practices exercised upon Native populations. 
                                                 
12
 I am unconcerned here as to whether the particular nonhuman animal, such as equine, 
originated on this continent. These species are Indigenous in regard to my political 
analysis because certain species have become culturally important to certain Native 
nations and vice versa. 
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 See “First Beings in American Indian Literatures.” Studies in American Indian 
Literatures 25.4 (2013). 3-7. 
14
 Mohawk insightfully explains that rather than being superstitious, Native narratives 
about animals form "a system of belief about how the world in structured and about 
how humans should behave in that world" (20). 
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Using a theory of first beings to read these texts undermines the racist trope of 
Indians as savage animals, while recognizing those instances in which our interests and 
the interests of other species coincide. I argue, through my readings of The Surrounded 
and Brothers Three, that confinement is the main political tactic wielded in the early 
20
th
 century against Indigenous political agency. Tactics of confinement, which were 
(and still are) detrimental to human and nonhuman Indigenous beings alike, were 
enacted through the practice of continually encroaching upon reserved tribal land and 
the parallel practice of keeping livestock in increasingly smaller fenced allotments. This 
is best evidenced in The Surrounded in Chapter Twenty-Seven in which the protagonist, 
Archilde, attempts to save a starving mare. A figurative reading of this chapter 
recognizes the mare as a Native American human and Archilde as the paternalistic 
federal agent who, in spite of his good intentions, is blind to the interests of the Indian. 
A literal reading (the mare as a domesticated nonhuman animal) helps us to understand 
how these tactics of confinement literally changed our relationships with other animals 
for the worse, but bifurcating our understanding of this chapter in McNickle’s novel—
reducing it to either a figurative or a literal reading—ignores the overlapping interests 
of first beings. To read McNickle’s chapter from that standpoint, I argue, allows us to 
understand more fully the implications of confronting a politics of confinement through 
domestication. I follow this with a reading of how a contemporaneous novel, John M. 
Oskison’s Brothers Three, alludes to these same concerns. We can understand these 
concerns in Oskison’s novel of domestication and confinement more clearly when 
placing it alongside The Surrounded. 
Sioux scholar Vine Deloria, Jr., gives us the most popular example of the 
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figurative use of confinement via domestication in Native theory. In Custer Died for 
Your Sins, Deloria provides a strong critique of race relations between white and Native 
peoples as he sees them in the late 1960s. In the first chapter, Deloria describes the 
earliest popular perceptions of Natives as "a picturesque species of wildlife," who were 
"wild animals to be hunted and skinned" (Custer 6-7). He goes on to explain that laws 
were repeatedly passed to make Indians "conform to white institutions" (Custer 8). 
Deloria describes how the solution to the “Indian Problem” morphed from the 
wholesale slaughter of Native populations to one which forced assimilationist policies 
upon Indigenous peoples. The implementation of laws in service of these policies 
encouraged the kidnapping of Native children who were delivered to boarding schools 
for re-education, and encouraged white churches to use their influence in order to erode 
tribal sovereignty. All of this was done, he writes, to insure that "Indians were forced 
into American life.” Deloria provocatively describes the situation as such that, through 
colonization, "the wild animal was made into a household pet whether or not he wanted 
to be one" (Custer 8). In following with the view of animal-like Indians, assimilationist 
policies such as those practiced at Carlisle Indian school (at least, under the 
administration of Richard Henry Pratt), forced land allotment, and other attempts at 
weakening tribal power were employed to individualize, or to continue Deloria's 
metaphor, to domesticate Native populations. Deloria cleverly exposes racist attitudes 
that have described Indigenous human populations as animalistic and which have, in 
one form or another, continued to thrive to this day.
15
 He uses the concept of 
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domestication to demonstrate this problematic relationship: one in which Indians are 
seen as animals—either wild or domesticated—in opposition to "civilized" humans.  
Directly following the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which sought to 
counteract these assimilative practices, D'Arcy McNickle's (Salish Kootenai) The 
Surrounded and John M. Oskison’s (Cherokee) Brothers Three show the effects of 
assimilationist policies not only on Native Americans, but also on how we narrate our 
relationships with nonhuman animals. Before looking at these two novels, it is 
important to note the similarities between domestication and assimilation that will be 
integral to my analysis of these texts. I do not intend to conflate these two concepts, 
although I do hope to carry some of the provocative effect of Deloria's language. 
Instead, what I am looking at specifically are texts in which problems of assimilation 
and domestication overlap. I'm interested here in how domestication figuratively 
represents assimilation, especially in instances when the texts also literally apply to 
nonhuman animals. Domestication in the stricter sense (that is, of nonhuman animals) 
happened alongside the domestication, or assimilation, of Indigenous populations 
through the discourse of individualism and the practice of allotment. 
The primary goal of domestication is to change the behavior of the nonhuman 
animal in such a way that it serves human interests instead of the interests of the 
nonhuman animal or the interests of the species. Practiced in such a way, domestication 
is speciesist: human interests are privileged at the cost of deprivileging, or altogether 
ignoring, the interests of nonhuman animals, who are almost invariably denied equal 
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consideration in the process of domestication.
16
 The justifications that substantiate 
colonial ideologies for assimilating Indians follow a similar logic. The difference is that 
assimilation denies equal consideration of interests in terms of race instead of species. 
The primary reason for assimilating Indigenous populations is to change the cultural 
behaviors of Native peoples so that they serve normative colonial interests rather than 
Indigenous or tribal interests.
 
The similarities between assimilation and domestication 
have to do with questions of who has the agency in the process and who is being 
changed to serve whose interests. Furthermore, the effects of colonization have, in 
several instances, not only denied agency to Natives through assimilationist and other 
methods but at the same time have denied interests (and the agency to fulfill those 
interests) to nonhuman animals through the similar method of domestication.
17
 
Domestication and assimilation are similar in their logical structure; however, it 
is an understatement that assimilation is a complicated concept with a long and troubled 
genealogy within colonial discourses about Native Americans as well as within Native 
discourses about colonial occupation. It would be helpful, therefore, to have a working 
definition of the term. One such definition is provided by Daniel Heath Justice 
(Cherokee), who writes that assimilation entails "the wholesale rejection of Indigenous 
values and their replacement with Eurowestern values, either through choice, coercion, 
or violence" (xvi). Here we have a description of assimilation which, although not 
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 For a thorough explanation of the concept of speciesism see Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation which includes a comparison of the logics of racism and speciesism (6). 
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 My point here is not to claim that all domestication of nonhuman animals serves the 
goals of the proponents of assimilation. The practice of keeping sheep among several 
Southwest tribes is understood as traditional and there is a long history of domesticating 
other species, such as canines, throughout the pre-colonial Americas. For instance, see 
Marion Schwartz's A History of Dogs in the Early America (Yale UP, 1998). 
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necessarily devoid of Native agency ("through choice" being one option), is not likely 
to be motivated by or to produce effects which are in the best interests of Indigenous 
peoples. Justice differentiates assimilation from what he, and others, have termed 
acculturation.
18
 He explains the concept of acculturation in relation to Cherokee culture 
as "the adaptation of certain western ways into a larger Cherokee context, thus changing 
some cultural expressions while maintaining the centrality of Cherokee identity and 
values" (xvi). 
Acculturation by definition allows more agency to Native actors. In 
understanding a particular cultural shift as acculturation, we can recognize how it 
accommodates consideration of Native interests by allowing more Indigenous agency in 
determining those interests. Indian novels, for instance, are not products of assimilation. 
In continuing tribal traditions of storytelling, Native novelists incorporate western forms 
of expression into the larger tribal context, thereby exercising more agency through 
acculturation while deciding which "Eurowestern values" to adopt and how to integrate 
them into existing tribal culture. These two ways of changing to fit mainstream 
American culture as Justice defines them—assimilation and acculturation—are only 
two points on the spectrum of responses to colonial pressures to adapt. Whether a 
specific cultural shift should be categorized as assimilation or acculturation is 
contingent upon the details of each case and should be determined from within the 
culture. The difference between the two is a complete rejection of tribal culture or an 
incorporation of outside values into existing tribal tradition. Whether by assimilation or 
by acculturation, the end goal (as far as dominant federal interests in the mid 1930s 
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were concerned) was the making of an ostensibly free American who owns a parcel of 
land and who uses that land, often through domesticating nonhuman animals in 
particular ways, to participate in the competition of the free market as an individual. 
The confining American narrative of individualism was a vehicle to assimilate 
Native peoples by absorbing us into mainstream white culture and stripping us of our 
tribal identities. As Joel Pfister writes, the concept of individualism is prevalent by "the 
nineteenth century—the era of the rise of industrial capitalism, of the White middle-
class cult of sentimentalized domesticity, of romanticism, and of Manifest Destiny," and 
reformers preached this doctrine (8). One of the most appalling distillations of this 
concept was Richard Henry Pratt's famous dictum to "kill the Indian in him, and save 
the man" (Pfister 44). Instead of the colonial rationale that Indians should be killed 
because we were savage animals, the new colonial tactic was to kill the Native cultures 
within us. Pratt was particularly enthusiastic about reforming Indians through education 
in this way. As Pfister explains, Natives were the "subjects of crusades mounted by 
White reformers and schools to 'individualize' them" (12). Individualism was the raison 
d'être of Carlisle Indian school, particularly under Pratt's administration. These reforms 
would create workers to fit the industrial capitalist mode of production and, at the same 
time, divest Native tribes of their political power. In the Great Plains, the occupations of 
farming and cattle-ranching were especially expected to transform Indians into properly 
assimilated, productive members of the dominant American way of life. Pfister 
describes the prevailing ideology as having become by this time one in which "cities, 
farms, and cattle had come to signify taking the 'right path': being Christian, American, 
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individual" (49). The problematic way individualism is manifested, Pfister writes, 
downplays Indigenous social modes of identity as well as "connectedness to the 
nonhuman" (17). These downplayed social modes, which stress relationality between 
humans and other species, are integral to many Native epistemologies. As a 
consequence of individualism through ideological and actual domestication, the 
importance of traditional theories of the relationships between Native peoples and 
nonhuman animals was overwhelmed by restrictive colonialist narratives. 
To define those Indigenous social modes that were downplayed, Pfister 
delineates the concept of individualism, which serves the goals of assimilation, from the 
concept of individuality, which is a less myopic way of conceptualizing an individual. 
Individuality has the potential to be adapted to diverse cultures rather than merely 
serving colonial designs. Many ways of understanding Native individuality include 
communal modes often incompatible with American individualism.
19
 Jace Weaver 
(Cherokee) recognizes Native individuality as existing in relation to the broader 
community. He writes that Native literature is most concerned with the "commitment to 
Native community" (xiii). In his description of Indigenous community, Weaver 
insightfully references Native ontologies when he writes that "no sharp distinction is 
drawn between the human and nonhuman persons that make up the community" (39). 
By contrast, the doctrine of individualism downplays Native ideologies that narrate 
connectedness to other species due, in part, to the legacy of Cartesian philosophy that 
informs it. Rene Descartes's "cogito ergo sum" was formulated, as Derrida maintains, 
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by denying other species agency or sentience (54).
20
 The foundational influence of 
Cartesian philosophy on individualism continues to deny animals the agency that Native 
discourses recognize and overshadows the many types of Indigenous individuality that 
connect us to the nonhuman world. 
My readings of these two early Native novels—McNickle's The Surrounded 
(1936) and Oskison’s Brothers Three (1935)—treat them as useful in understanding 
how the doctrine of individualism constricts our relationships with nonhuman animals 
and how certain practices of domestication show potential for Indigenous individualities 
that demonstrate more balanced relationships between humans and other species. These 
novels were published directly after the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and, as such, 
are productively read in relation to the political landscape surrounding this important 
piece of legislation. This act, often referred to as the “Indian New Deal,” was 
championed by John Collier in an attempt to undo damage done by the Dawes 
Allotment Act and other policies (c. 1890s-1930s) inflicted upon tribal cultures in the 
colonial goal of assimilation through individualism. These political discussions, in 
which McNickle was involved, were abundant with the growing possibilities of tribal 
resurgence through the recognition of diverse Native individualities. As such, The 
Surrounded and Brothers Three provide a good starting points for an inquiry into 
domestication and individualism in a Native context. Besides being influenced by the 
political landscape, these novels are largely informed by the author’s own experiences 
with nonhuman animals. These novels portray domestication as problematic for first 
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 Descartes wrote that nonhuman animals are "automata" (Regan and Singer 14). 
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beings, that is, both Indigenous human populations and nonhuman animals. They show 
how certain U.S. policies encouraged particular practices of domestication for economic 
gain while unsuccessfully attempting to domesticate Native individualities that did not 
fall in line with the American narrative of individualism. 
As previously mentioned, political discourse in the early 20
th
 century made 
figurative use of nonhuman domestication. The idea of political oppression as 
domestication likely influenced McNickle’s work. He was directly involved in Native 
politics and, in fact, “the same year The Surrounded was published,” McNickle began 
working for John Collier, who served as the Commissioner for the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs from 1933 to 1945 and who also was the driving force behind the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (Parker 68). As Deloria explains, the act was created to 
combat the forces of assimilation that had been weakening Native political and cultural 
agency. Collier envisioned tribal governments would be "incorporated as a business 
venture" under the new act (Deloria, Reorganization xiii). It allowed tribes to choose 
who represented their interests to the federal government. Any Native person could be 
nominated as an agent representing the tribe as long as that person was a citizen of the 
United States, at least twenty-eight years old, and had worked in “agriculture for at least 
five years" (Deloria, Reorganization ix).
21
 Agriculture, including domestication of 
livestock, was a pre-requisite for representation in the awakening recognition of tribal 
political interests. 
In relation to the practices of farming and ranching, Deloria notes that "it is 
plainly evident that the intent of the bill was to ensure that the allotment policy be 
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strengthened by hiring a person better acquainted with local agricultural activities" 
(Reorganization iv). Strengthening allotment policies by requiring agricultural 
experience, however, was a concession to Collier's original intent. He had assumed that 
Indians would be interested in returning individually-held acreage to tribal communal 
holdings, thereby reversing the confining effects of allotment. What Collier found, 
however, while traveling around Indian Country to lobby for the act, was that Native 
people were reluctant to reverse the land privatization set in motion by the Dawes Act 
and similar policies (Reorganization xiii). Many had grown comfortable with owning 
land individually and were wary about transferring their land to communal ownership, 
even if it was to be restored to their tribal nations. Regardless of this setback, the intent 
and effect of the Indian Reorganization Act was to provide systemic agency, albeit 
limited, for the collective interests of Native nations by giving each nation the power to 
elect a representative. These representatives would then be recognized by the federal 
government in a more consistent fashion than tribal spokespeople had been in the past.
22
  
The Indian New Deal provided more Indigenous agency in the form of 
representation to mitigate against the policies of domestication driven by the doctrine of 
individualism. Collier used domestication figuratively when lobbying Natives to 
support the Reorganization Act. Shortly before the act was passed, in a 1934 meeting of 
in Rapid City, South Dakota, Collier explained that Natives needed to organize as 
corporations to exercise political agency effectively. Using domestication figuratively, 
similar to how Deloria did many years later, Collier explained that the act was a 
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 Alicia Kent explains that McNickle applied to work with Collier "in part out of a 
desire to become a part of these changes" to tribal governance (29). 
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 This is until the federal termination policies starting in the 1940s. 
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solution to the problematic choice of being either dependent on the federal government 
or neglected by it. He announced at the meeting that "Indians have been taught that they 
had to choose between remaining like so many domestic animals being taken care of by 
the Indian Bureau or else thrown to the wolves" (as cited in Deloria, Reorganization 
31). Here is a clear figuration of the Indian as domestic nonhuman animal. While 
Collier depicted the position of Indians as “domestic animals” in relation to federal 
paternalism, he eschewed the colonial alternative of “wild animals” (as Deloria terms 
it), instead portraying settlers as the wild “wolves.” It is within this same political 
landscape in which Indians are referred to as domesticated nonhuman animals, that 
McNickle rewrites the draft of his first published novel.
23
 As Pfister explains, The 
Surrounded "narrates the anger and resentment many Natives felt in response to 
Euramerican efforts to make them dependent" (218). It is fitting that as part of this 
resentment, McNickle chooses to depict the suffering of domesticated nonhuman 
animals to dramatize the political situation into which Native nations were forced by the 
federal government. Collier’s metaphor of Indians as domestic pets (or unwilling pets as 
described by Deloria) and McNickle's use of nonhuman animals figuratively stand in for 
colonized Indians. In response to the ongoing debates about Native sovereignty, Collier 
and McNickle use the metaphor of domesticated nonhuman animals to spread 
awareness of the political strategy of confinement.
24
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 The Hungry Generation is what McNickle called the first draft of The Surrounded. 
As Birgit Hans explains, it "would have fitted very comfortably into the group of early 
[Native] novels if McNickle had managed to get it published before he started serious 
revisions in 1934" (2). The final draft is stylistically more modern. 
24
 McNickle also uses this language in his nonfiction. As he writes that in the popular 
imagination, the idea of the vanishing Indian "occasioned regret, it was no more deeply 
felt than that expressed for the extermination of the passenger pigeon and the buffalo. 
  
39 
In addition to McNickle's attention to and involvement in Native politics, his 
experiences growing up in what would become the setting for The Surrounded shaped 
the use of nonhuman animals in his writing. In her account of McNickle's family 
history, Dorothy Parker writes that his grandfather, Isidore Parenteau, was forced to 
leave his cattle ranch in Saskatchewan to find work elsewhere (6). She further details 
that the family moved to Montana where McNickle "spent most of his childhood" on 
the Flathead Indian Reservation where he was an enrolled member of the tribe (7).
25
 
Parker describes the valley where McNickle grew up as "ideally suited for stock raising, 
and areas not under cultivation were open range" where “horses and cattle grazed freely 
during winter and were rounded up in the spring for branding and farm work" (8). This 
communal use of the land was more suitable for domesticating nonhuman animals. 
Fencing land that had previously served as open, communal range created less feeding 
ground for animals who had grown up grazing on public lands. Parker writes that 
McNickle remembers that after the allotment and subsequent influx of white 
homesteaders, "the range was fenced and the local people were forced to sell their herds 
because they could no longer support them" (16). Local ranchers, concerned with the 
loss of livestock from insufficient acreage and with the nonhuman suffering that it 
entailed, were forced to pay to ship in additional feed, a cost to which they were not 
accustomed, or to sell large portions of their herds. Here, Parker describes McNickle’s 
concern with how the policies of assimilation, particularly allotment, created problems 
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3-4). 
25
 Parker explains that with evidence of his Canadian Cree ancestry, his father 
convinced the Salish Kootenai tribe to adopt McNickle. His tribal enrollment became a 
point of contention between his parents. 
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for Native humans as well as their domestic nonhuman animals.  
Collier, as well as McNickle, recognized the suffering of domesticated 
nonhuman animals. In his push for support of the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier 
demonstrated a keen awareness of the suffering of domestic nonhuman animals kept by 
Southwest tribes who faced a similar shortage of land. Arguing the need for herd 
reduction because of environmental issues and diminished land holdings, Collier said 
that he saw "terrible things" such as "cattle standing with icicles hanging clear to the 
ground, of their frozen breath and I saw sheep dead, frozen in the cold" (Deloria, 
Reorganization 169). Both Collier and McNickle recognized and detailed the way in 
which land allotment, in contrast to traditional modes of agriculture practiced, resulted 
in restrictive practices of domestication to the detriment of both formerly sovereign 
nations and their nonhuman animal livestock. 
Concern for nonhumans in relationships of domestication is practiced, both by 
Indians and non-Indians, in traditional agriculture. As Bernard Rollin explains, "if the 
animals thrived, the producers thrived. The animals' interests were the producers' 
interests" (6). Rollin is concerned here with practical ethics. He writes that he 
recognizes through his work with ranchers that their practices of traditional agriculture 
rely on an obligation to their livestock. In fulfilling this obligation, humans feed and 
protect the domesticated animals against predators in order to create better conditions 
for the nonhuman animals than if left to fend for themselves" (5). Rollin explains that 
ranchers with small herds still practice this kind of traditional husbandry to this day. In 
doing so, they see themselves "as stewards of land and animals, as living a way of life 
as well as making a living" (55). Ranchers of smaller herds, like McNickle's 
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grandfather, are successful if they keep in mind the interests of their livestock by 
alleviating suffering, excepting, perhaps, the act of slaughter.  
For McNickle, one of the most vivid events that illustrates the effects of 
allotment practices upon nonhuman animals was a buffalo roundup. Parker explains that 
a specific buffalo herd “posed a particular problem, as buffalo were notoriously difficult 
to keep fenced" (16). McNickle remembered being a witness to the collection of this 
particular herd. He recounted that "as a child of five or six I stood watching, amazed 
and terror-stricken, through the heavy timbers of the corral. One buffalo cow had been 
gored and her insides were pouring out. I either saw or was told about the great bull 
who went charging up the ramp and right through the other side of the stock car" (16).
26
 
This experience undoubtedly raised McNickle’s awareness of problems associated with 
the domestication of nonhuman animals. Indeed, it was partially his upbringing on the 
Flathead Indian Reservation, in addition to his political experience within the Collier 
administration, that inspired McNickle to use the trope of domestication to represent 
attempts to disrupt Native cultures by means of assimilationist policies. These 
experiences clearly inform McNickle’s use of nonhuman animal domestication in his 
first published novel.  
In The Surrounded, McNickle portrays the shared indigeneity of first beings by 
depicting the suffering of nonhuman domestic animals and the corresponding emotional 
suffering of his protagonist. While on a self-imposed lonely trip to the Badlands, 
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 Parker notes that some buffalo did escape the roundup and "became the original herd 
of the National Bison Range, Moiese, Montana" (261). See video with Tim Preso, 
managing attorney of the Earthjustice Northern Rockies office, explaining the 
importance of rebuilding Bison populations whose decimation was encouraged by the 
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Archilde happens upon a horse who has been left to fend for herself and her colt on the 
barren terrain. The narrator describes these abandoned animals as having been "willing 
workers in their day," who now have been discarded and suffer in a state of profound 
neglect (237). This neglect is evidenced by the description of the elderly mare as 
"unbelievably thin and gaunt. Every vertebra was visible, even to the point where the rib 
was attached, and the sharp hip bones had worn the hair away when she lay down" 
(238). Archilde is distressed at this sight, and this recognition of nonhuman suffering 
compels him to save the mare because "his feelings would not allow him to abandon 
her" (240). Trying to improve the mare’s chances for survival, Archilde spends several 
hours coaxing and chasing her so that he may lead her to a more suitable spot to graze 
and drink. (242). Archilde eventually succeeds and catches the mare; however, as he 
begins to lead her slowly and painfully to the watering hole, he notes that she is 
severely lame, perhaps as a result of the hours he has spent pursuing her. He is 
profoundly disturbed, so much so that the mare’s “every limping step tortured him" 
(241). In this dramatic episode, McNickle shows us mutual suffering—Archilde 
recognizes the physical pain endured by the mare, which causes him to suffer 
emotionally in sympathy for her plight. He wants to feed her oats and trim her mud-
entangled tail because "it was the least thing a creature of feeling could do" (238). By 
characterizing both Archilde and the mare as "creature[s] of feeling" and depicting their 
mutual suffering, the narrator places the two within the category of sentient beings, 
momentarily obscuring the distinction between human and nonhuman.  
Sadly, at the end of the chapter, Archilde’s need to alleviate the mare’s suffering 
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overwhelms his judgment. The narrator tells us that Archilde is aware that "he was 
probably driving her away from water and her usual feeding ground—but he couldn't 
stop" (240). His attempt at benevolent domestication fails and unfortunately leads to 
more acute suffering. When he finally succeeds in leading the mare to a source of water, 
she falls to the ground and refuses to eat or drink in her exhausted state. Even in her 
pitiful condition, the mare vocalizes a last protest against Archilde, groaning "a final 
note of reproach for the ears of the man who had taken it upon himself to improve her 
condition" (242). Upon hearing the coyotes in the distance and in a fit of frustration, 
Archilde shoots the mare dead, scorning her as a "perverse creature" (242). This 
gruesome episode closes with Archilde her corpse from the coyotes for no clear reason 
other than his confused emotional state. Archilde's compulsive need to improve the 
situation of the mare who had been left for dead results in a macabre display of 
misguided domestication. 
McNickle shows in this chapter how individualism disrupts tribal identity by 
representing the domesticated relationships of tribes to the federal government through 
the figure of the mare. In addition, McNickle illustrates the literal consequences of 
federal policies on our relationships with nonhuman animals. Laird Christensen 
recognizes this when he claims that assimilation in the novel works to diminish 
ecological modes of Salish knowledge and denigrate "traditional patterns of relating to 
family, society, and ultimately the more-than-human world" (3). Archilde is distraught 
because he realizes that the traditional Salish balance between human and nonhuman 
has been disrupted. This novel shows how the same strategy of confinement that led to 
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the dominance of American individualism and allotment led to the suffering of more 
than just the human species. 
Critics have analyzed McNickle's depiction of the mare in this chapter as 
symbolizing Indigenous human suffering due to the destructive effects of assimilative 
practices that confine Native culture. Alicia Kent, for example, reads the episode 
between Archilde and the mare as representing "paternalism of federal policy toward 
Native Americans" (32). Understood in this way, the effect that the doctrine of 
individualism has on Archilde is evident from the beginning of the chapter as he is 
"spending much of his time alone" (236). Archilde is alienated from both his father's 
and his mother's way of life, which as Robert Holton notes, are depicted as antagonistic 
through their separated living situation early in the novel.
27
 As The Surrounded begins, 
Archilde has returned from his life of traveling and playing violin to help with a harvest, 
but is reluctant to become a farmer like his father, Max. The narrator tells us that 
Archilde will bring in the fall harvest and "would take care of that as part of his last 
duty to Max, then he would pack his clothes" (236). Archilde is not very interested in 
taking the "right path," as Pfister terms it, of becoming a farmer with all the 
individualism that the occupation entails.
28
 The “right path” ends up being the wrong 
path or Archilde who feels alienated from his Salish mother. Acquiescing to American 
individualism would alienate him from his Salish identity, one of the many diverse 
Native individualities that rely on community connection.  
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 Holton explains that "a sense of cultural division is apparent from the opening 
paragraphs of The Surrounded as Archilde arrives home to visit his Native mother who 
lives in her more traditional dwelling and his white father who lives in his ranch house 
nearby" (74). 
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The figure of the nonhuman animal signifying traditional Salish individuality is 
prevalent in The Surrounded. Archilde, early in the novel, thinks that the elders of his 
tribe did not seem like "real people" (62). He continues by explaining that "the 
buffaloes had been real things to his mother, and to the old people who had come to eat 
with her tonight. To him they were just fenced up animals that couldn't be shot, though 
you could take photographs of them" (62). Other clear textual evidence exists for us to 
read the mare as an Indigenous human. Directly before the badlands chapter, the 
narrator tells us that a poor, blind, and deaf old Indian woman is “living like an animal” 
by bringing home the waste product from slaughterhouse rendering (234). Archilde's 
attempt at helping her also fails (233-4). Furthermore, the narrator compares the 
attempts of Archilde's nephews, Mike and Narcisse, at running away from home to the 
mare's situation in that they should be left alone (248). We can see the mare standing in 
figuratively for Indians, and Archilde representing federal policies aimed at to 
paternalistically improving the situation of Native peoples. One of the larger effects of 
these paternalistic colonial narratives has been the change in how Natives relate to the 
land, including its nonhuman inhabitants. As Archilde's mother explains, "In the old 
way of living one never stayed in one place for very long. One camped wherever there 
was game and grass and water for the horses" (172). Confinement policies were enacted 
to force the nomadic lifestyle of Plains tribes into agrarian modes and to also force 
those tribes that had always practiced agriculture to do so in more confined spaces, or 
allotments. Domestication of nonhuman animals on increasingly smaller fenced 
allotments as a means of providing sustenance and a new way of living was pushed to 
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replace traditional hunting relationships with nonhuman animals.  
Craig Womack reads this novel's use of other animals literally, in “There is No 
Respectful Way to Kill an Animal,” as depicting the exploitive hunting relationships to 
which nonhuman animals are subjected. Womack references an earlier hunting scene 
where Archilde refuses to kill a doe, eliciting scorn from his mother for being a poor 
Salish hunter. Drawing on personal hunting experience, Womack's analysis of the 
relationship between himself and a hunted doe apply as equally to game animals as to 
the domesticated mare, despite his and Archilde’s different intents. Womack writes that 
"there is no way to escape the fundamental inequity of the relationship. I would go as 
far as to say the lack of relationship: she's dead, we're not" (12). Womack explains that 
Archilde displays "a potential understanding for nonviolent relationships with animals 
that he never quite succeeds in understanding" in his hesitation to kill the doe (14). This 
same lack of understanding leads Archilde to ignore the agency of the mare whose 
condition he "had taken it upon himself to improve" with fatal results (242). He 
practices a form of domestication with the mare in which the interests of the nonhuman 
animal are actively worked against because, as Womack observes, "Archilde thinks he 
understands what is best for the recalcitrant animal. In fact, he thinks he understands 
better than she does" (16). In terms of the mare's interest, Womack also astutely notes 
that Archilde’s actions also have decreased the "chances of survival of her young colt" 
(16). This lost potential for the recognition of nonhuman agency and the interests of the 
mare is a result of federal policies of allotment and individualism and the subsequent 
disconnection from the land and its many species of inhabitants. The chapter in which 
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McNickle's protagonist encounters the mare in the badlands works on both the 
figurative level by dramatizing assimilative practices affecting Indians and on the literal 
level by depicting problematic practices of nonhuman animal domestication caused by 
the same colonial forces. A colonial strategy of confinement domesticates both the 
Salish people and nonhuman animals.  
Federal assimilation policies changed ranching practices despite the best 
interests of Indigenous humans or nonhumans. Archilde finding a mare left in the 
badlands would not have been an isolated incident at the time but an unfortunate 
standard occurrence. The narrator tells us that "frequently in the fall ranchers with no 
hay would turn all their stock loose and forget about them until spring. Then they would 
ride out to collect those that had survived" (37). Diane L. Beers explains that this 
practice of letting the livestock "fend for themselves was so common in the plains and 
mountain states that some lawmakers specifically excluded the intentional starvation of 
livestock from their cruelty statutes" (102). Animal rights organizations at the time, 
specifically American Red Star, lobbied vociferously against the practice (101).
29
 
However, before legislation pushing for land allotment, this practice of letting livestock 
graze in open fields was in the best interests of both rancher and the livestock when, as 
Parker notes, "pasturage was plentiful" (8). After allotment changed the landscape, 
which McNickle experienced during his lifetime, the abundant grasslands were 
confined to so many individually owned, fenced parcels. In the episode with the mare, 
McNickle references this specific practice of domestication and the change in federal 
policy against communally-held lands that corrupts it. These changes are evident as the 
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narrator tells us that Archilde notices that all the cattle and horses had been collected 
but "only the hopelessly old and crippled were left, and they were a sad lot" (237). 
Beers explains that, spurred by American Red Star, "investigators as well as local 
volunteers began a thorough examination of range stock conditions" (119). She notes 
that during these examinations American Red Star "found the stock owners very ready 
to cooperate with them.'" (119). Ranchers were understandably concerned with 
minimizing the suffering of their livestock, especially since federal allotment practices 
had imposed upon the existing, standard free-range practices. The interests of the 
livestock in not suffering from starvation was also in the best interests of the ranchers. 
This common interest, however, was corrupted by federal policies of assimilation and 
confinement. 
When we take seriously both the figurative and literal readings of the Badlands 
episode of McNickle's first published novel, we read it from the standpoint of first 
beings. In doing so, we see how the suffering of Indigenous humans is a result of 
policies of confinement which are responsible for allotment practices. These allotment 
practices are also inextricably linked to the confinement and suffering of nonhuman 
animals. In the chapter where Archilde encounters the mare in the badlands, McNickle 
chronicles the beginning of how new processes of animal agriculture were forced upon 
Indigenous peoples. These practices of fencing off herds have reached their grim 
conclusion in the extreme confinement practices used in current industrial agriculture— 
what Rollin calls "confinement agriculture," where profit margins and antibiotics, along 
with the abandonment of traditional husbandry, have led to the "physical and 
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psychological deprivation" of the nonhuman animals whose suffering is necessary for 
its existence (11). This suffering is endemic due to "lack of space, lack of 
companionship for social animals, inability to move freely, boredom" and other 
problems due to the confined spaces that industrial agriculture uses (11-2). Confinement 
agriculture is abhorred by those who still practice traditional nonhuman animal 
husbandry, Rollin notes, because they understand "their animals are more than mere 
economic commodities" (55). Colonial narratives of confinement are integral not only 
to how we domesticate nonhuman animals but how federal policies domesticate Native 
populations. As Kent writes about The Surrounded, "confinement becomes the 
controlling metaphor for modernity in McNickle's novel, most obviously suggested in 
its title" (37). Like the allotment fences, the discourse of individualism confines the 
possibility of competing native individualities, some of which connect us to nonhuman 
animals. The restricting doctrine of individualism is inseparable from the practice of 
confinement agriculture of nonhuman animals. Colonization perpetuates a restrictive 
culture for humans and nonhumans alike. 
Some texts are more readily understood through the standpoint of first beings 
than others. Another strongly autobiographical novel contemporary with The 
Surrounded gives us an example of a less obvious text—one that makes sense to read 
from the standpoint of first beings when read alongside The Surrounded. Brothers 
Three, by John M. Oskison, a citizen of the Cherokee Nation who was born and raised 
in rural Oklahoma, was published in 1935, a year before The Surrounded.  
The novel is a frontier romance about the sons of Francis Odell and three 
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generations of the family living as farmers and ranchers in Indian Territory under the 
jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation (what Oskison refers to as "old I.T."). As Bethany 
Ridgway Schneider explains in Oskison's entry in the Heath Anthology of American 
Literature, the novel "traces the tragedy of mixed-blood siblings who give up a 
traditional relationship to the land in order to pursue the American dream of individual 
wealth" (198). This 448-page novel is divided more or less evenly among the three sons 
of Francis, the sections being named "Timmy," "The Herdsman" (for Roger), and 
"Mister" (the nickname for Henry). The novel continues past the early death of the 
mother, Janet, and the eventual death of the father, Francis, to explore how the three 
sons handle the family farm. Timmy pursues a life in town in banking and business. 
Roger continues his father’s interests in cattle although he leaves the management of the 
farm to Timmy’s wife, May. Mister is the only of the brothers to receive a college 
education. He tries to become a writer, fails, and then tries to play the stock market to 
regain the diminishing family farm holdings. This also fails, as it coincides with the 
stock market crash of 1929. The novel ends on a note of hope in the future of the farm, 
although little evidence is given to the reader to warrant such optimism. 
Like McNickle, Oskison’s rural upbringing informs the use of nonhuman 
animals in this novel, which is also strongly autobiographical. Although we should not 
reduce Oskison's novel to a simple biographical reading, there are many parallels 
between his actual life as depicted in his unfinished autobiography and the Odell family 
as described in the novel. As in Oskison's real life, the patriarch of the family is white, 
but has been granted citizenship in the Cherokee Nation through marriage to a Cherokee 
woman. Janet, the mother of the three brothers in the novel, like Oskison's own mother, 
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dies when the boys are young. Henry (or Mister as he is often called), like Oskison, 
leaves the farm to receive an education and to become a writer. Oskison does not depict 
the shared interests with nonhuman animals as concisely as does McNickle in the 
Badlands chapter. There are many excerpts, however, in which the characters entertain 
more radical notions of animal agency. So there is potential in Oskison’s novel for this 
understanding that we are, however, first beings. The novel also depicts characters who 
practice responsible traditional agriculture and husbandry. 
Just as a concern for suffering is important in husbandry practices, concern for 
the suffering of other animals was also important in Oskison's personal life. In his 
unfinished autobiography, there is evidence that his father influenced him regarding 
animal ethics.
 30
 Oskison compares his father, John, to a child in a Dickensian novel. 
After his father's parents died when John was just two years old, he came to live with 
his uncle as an "unwanted orphan" (65). The extent to which John was unwanted is 
relayed by the story of him being neglected as a beast of burden. His father recounts 
being forced, at a young age, to drive a team of oxen on all-night trips to St. Louis. 
Oskison explains that his father "remembered with bitterness winter nights on the road, 
and the agony of staying awake as he trudged along beside the oxen, thinly clothed and 
badly shod" (65). John is resentful of the mistreatment to which his uncle subjects him, 
such as this instance of being forced, at a young age, to drive oxen. This story also 
strongly suggests that he recognizes his own suffering as shared between himself and 
the oxen—instead of John recounting that he drove the oxen, he says that he was 
"trudging along beside" them. With bitterness, John explains that his uncle did not 
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expect him to live long and "wanted to get all the work he could out of me while I was 
alive" (66). Further reason to assume that attention to the suffering of other animals was 
impressed upon Oskison by his father is John's reluctance to hunt at night. Oskison 
relates that his "father would not do night shooting, saying that he didn't want the 
thought of a crippled and suffering bird on his conscience" (73). This concern for 
animal suffering, passed down from his father, provides evidence for why we see 
episodes touching upon the suffering and interests of other animals in Brothers Three. 
In addition to Oskison's father being treated, as depicted, as a beast of burden, 
we are shown correct and incorrect ways of treating and thinking about domestic 
nonhuman animals in the novel. We are shown other characteristics of relationships 
with nonhuman animals that the novel portrays as incorrect and non-Indian, specifically 
as belonging to white culture, or more particular to the "invaders of this Indian land" 
(54). The narrator tells us that those invading Indian Territory were drawn by "skinny 
old horses or gaunt sore-shouldered mules" (55). Oskison opens his autobiography by 
explaining how he inherited his temper from his white father. This temper is most 
vividly depicted in Brothers Three when, in a fit of "white-faced fury," Francis 
"mercilessly" whips an uncooperative mule, causing the animal much suffering (23).  
In contradiction to these foreign ways of treating animals (and Francis's own 
treatment of the mule), we see examples of proper traditional husbandry. For example, 
the narrator explains that Francis "noted with satisfaction that Roger already knew the 
cattle as individuals" (66). As the narrator explains, it was important to be able to single 
out livestock who needed special feeding and would only thrive under careful practices 
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involving individual attention (66), even calling for “surgeon-like attention to the 
animal” to ensure that the animals were in the best health possible, (167). Roger also 
muses that "a horse to him was something more than a four-legged beast with strength 
to carry a rider and more or less sense. It was individual, as distinctive as one of his 
brothers" (167). Oskison's novel does not stop at working animals being seen in more 
respectful terms that take into consideration their interests. The youngest son, Mister, 
notes that he had "never been able to think of animals merely as objects to be bought, 
tended, and sold" (198). The buying and selling of cattle, however, is the exact business 
of the Odell family. This is one reason that leads Mister away from the "traditional 
relationship to the land," as Schneider phrases it, to New York and to a life of writing. 
Like the comparisons of animals to humans in McNickle’s novel, there are 
several places in Brothers Three where Oskison uses nonhuman animals to figuratively 
depict Mister, the character who most closely resembles himself. We are told by the 
narrator that when Henry was given the nickname "Mister" by a family friend, his 
mother asked, "who are you calling Mister, the baby or the dog?" (315). A further use of 
nonhuman animals as figuratively representing Mister is shown during his attempt to 
imagine what his first moments of life were like. He pictures "his own serious, wrinkled 
monkey face" (315). Furthermore, he imagines that, as a small child who nursed from 
his Aunt Liza, that he did so like "as a purring kitten" (316). It is not only his early life 
where Mister uses the figure of nonhuman animals to describe humans. While looking 
at microbes in biology class at college, Mister recalls that he "tried to write the usual 
student observations, then got to imagining them as human and described their capers 
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and quoted their observations on me and the instructors and professors" (327). We can 
see that Oskison is using the figure of the nonhuman animal to depict Mister and also to 
show us how he imagines other humans. The one point where the novel shows the 
greatest potential for and understanding of human and nonhuman as first beings is the 
realization is Roger’s recognition that nonhuman animals are “individual, as distinctive 
as one of his brothers” (167). 
Roger's realization that the cattle are individuals can be explained in terms of his 
privileging good husbandry techniques over shoddy work with the livestock. As Rollin 
explains, the interests of a rancher practicing traditional agriculture and the interests of 
the nonhuman animal overlap to a great degree in raising livestock in a traditional way. 
By understanding the cattle as having individual interests, Roger can reduce the 
suffering of the nonhuman animals and ensure that they thrive and subsequently return a 
good profit when slaughtered, but Mister's realization of the cattle as more than 
commodities is a much more radical realization. Along with seeking his education and 
career as a writer, this realization is one of the influences that lead him away from the 
farm. Paradoxically, it is a singular encounter with an individual steer that ultimately 
prompts Mister to return to his farm and strengthens his resolve to devote his time and 
energy to restoring it to its former glory. While walking around the city and thinking 
about the farm, Mister encounters a steer leading a herd confined to a feed lot. The 
narrator tells us that Mister 
sat statue-like waiting to see the lot-fed steers appear: they had sensed 
his presence and, somewhat fearfully, were marching in mass to 
investigate. The white-faced leader emerged from the shadows, stopped, 
and the others crowded up on it. Blowing, the steer advanced slowly 
until Henry put out a hand to touch its muzzle. Then the beast whirled, 
snorting and led the rest away at a lumbering gallop. (437) 
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It is this act of reaching to touch an individual steer that prompts Mister to reassess his 
time on the farm. He comes to the realization that "it's details like that I must have for 
my stories . . . I've been a fool to imagine I could find reality anywhere else" (437). 
Mister later proclaims that "the Farm's a Living Organism" and decides to go back to 
revive it by renovating the fields and structures on it (448). But it is notable here that 
Mister forgets his earlier, more radical objection to raising livestock, that nonhuman 
animals are more than "objects to be bought, tended, and sold" (198). Oskison's novel 
shows potential for understanding ourselves as first beings in these passages, this 
becomes clearer when reading it alongside the badlands chapter of The Surrounded.
31
 
Mister fails to recognize the nonhuman animals as individuals in practice but, 
instead, sees his own path to individualism through the domestication of livestock. We 
should give more weight to Mister’s failure in this endeavor when we note that in his 
nonfiction, not only does Oskison use the language of domestication to describe the 
situation of Indians but he also recognizes the problems affecting herds and tribes 
confined to reservations. In "Making an Individual of the Indian," Oskison writes that 
when put on reservations and rations, the Indian lost romantic appeal and "became of no 
more interest than any other stall-fed creature" (380).
32
 Here, we can see that just like 
Collier, McNickle, and Deloria, he is using domesticated nonhuman animals as the 
figurative vehicle for Indigenous humans.  
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 I don't argue that Archilde makes this connection in The Surrounded. His confusion 
is, in fact, indicative of a lack of understanding. However, I do argue that McNickle 
shows us how human and nonhuman interests coalesce in his novel, whereas Brothers 
Three does not quite seem to make the connection despite many of the elements being 
there. 
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Oskison’s answer to this problem of confinement on reservations is that the 
"modern Indian must be thought of as an individual, not merely as a unit in certain tribal 
groups" (381). He lauds the idea of "individual responsibility" which, as he argues, has 
"been directed toward getting every tribesman into his own house, on his own land, and 
at work for himself" (381-2).
33
 The doctrine of individualism that McNickle depicts as 
the problem is, for Osksion, the answer to Native problems. It should be noted, 
however, that Oskison advocated individualism as a solution but only contingent on 
Indigenous agency in choosing it.
34
 Lionel Larré explains that Oskison's work "signifies 
that the only struggle worth fighting was the struggle against the ultimate 
dehumanization that the paternalistic reservation system tended to accomplish" (15). In 
reading Oskison's work as more than that of a fervent assimilationist, Larré writes that, 
even though Oskison was a founding member of the Society of American Indians, 
which advocated assimilation, Oskison rarely used the word, preferring instead the 
word “amalgamation” (13). This concept of amalgamation, while maintaining a sense of 
Native identity, is, however, far from the harsh critique of individualism seen in 
McNickle's novel through its depiction of a Native individuality that connects us to the 
nonhuman world. We might see Oskison’s critique of individualism without Native 
agency in Mister’s failure to understand the intertwined problems of Native humans and 
nonhumans. 
Oskison’s characterization of Mister as being unrealistically hopeful in the 
survival of the family farm brings Oskison’s seemingly disconnected critiques of 
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reservation policies and animal welfare together. In his nonfiction, Oskison recognizes 
the same problem with herd management in the Southwest that McNickle notices in the 
newly-allotted Indian lands in Montana. His solution is class-based, to show the shared 
interests of white owners of small herds and Native ranchers. In "Arizona and Forty 
Thousand Indians," Oskison writes about the Navajos that "the growth of their herds 
and flocks has forced them to seek pasture outside the limits of their mountain and 
desert reservation" (422).
35
 Here, we see Oskison recognizing confinement as a problem 
for both the Navajo and their domestic nonhuman animals. Oskison lauds a particular 
white rancher who works well with the Navahos and does not mind their herds 
wandering onto his land because "they look after my stock" when they wander onto the 
reservation (422). This friendly white rancher is placed against "the big cattle 
companies [which] are vastly more concerned over the question of making profit" than 
the interests of the Navajo and their herds (423). Even though Oskison recognizes the 
same problems that McNickle uses to great effect in The Surrounded—notably the 
culture of confinement that affects human and nonhuman animals—he does not allow 
Mister to quite make this connection in Brothers Three.  
Oskison's critique of the "big cattle companies" is an apt observation for the 
time. Agriculture, most notably the cattle industry, was growing rapidly before the 
thirties; according to Rollin’s accounts, it had doubled in the hundred years before 1920 
and also doubled between 1920 and 1950 (8). Fewer workers were dealing with more 
livestock while supplying an increasing number of postwar consumers. Traditional 
ranching techniques were abandoned to deal with the volume of livestock. As Beers 
                                                 
35
 Published in Southern Workman, March 1914. 
  
58 
notes, "the sheer volume of animals entering plant gates soared during the interwar 
period" (103). This growth in volume caused even more suffering for the nonhuman 
animals at the slaughterhouses. The increase "pushed the mallet men beyond their 
physical capabilities, meaning that fewer of their blows struck their mark. 
Consequently, thousands of animals were fully conscious when they went to the killing 
floor"(103). This growth of demand and subsequent supply of beef along with fewer 
workers is only possible with an increase in productivity including "mechanization, 
technological advancement, and the consequent capability of confining large numbers 
of animals in highly capitalized facilities" (Rollin 9). Unlike Roger's careful husbandry 
that relies on knowledge of the animals as individuals, the change from traditional to 
industrial agriculture meant "less attention is paid to individual animals" (Rollin 9). And 
less attention, increasing degree of confinement and the growth in the size of herds also 
led to the exponential increase in the suffering of these domestic nonhuman animals. 
The path of individualism was paved with increased suffering for many individual 
nonhuman animals. 
We can see that despite Oskison’s use of the figure of the "stall-fed creature" to 
critique reservation policies, Mister fails to fully recognize the interconnected interests 
between domestic nonhuman animals and Indigenous peoples in Brothers Three. What 
is most noticeable if we focus on the interests of other animals, though, is the lack of 
attention to the suffering of nonhuman domestic animals when it would exist in one of 
its most extreme forms: the overworked slaughterhouse. There is only one mention of 
the suffering during slaughter. It is by Janice, a woman from New York who becomes 
Mister’s wife. She visits with a romantic interest in the lifestyle of the cattlemen. In 
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thinking about the large mass of cattle destined for the slaughterhouse, she excitedly 
wonders, "what a river of blood would flow from their carcasses!" (201). What is 
troubling in Brothers Three—given all of this attention to animal suffering and even 
Janice's speculation of how the killing floor would look—is the complete absence of 
consideration of the other animals' interests after the family travels with the cattle to the 
Chicago stockyards. There is not any further concern mentioned for the suffering the 
nonhuman animals would inevitably endure. The final fate of the cattle is ignored. This 
is congruent with John Berger's claim that "animals have gradually disappeared” under 
the economic mode of industrial capitalism (11). Philip Armstrong explains in his 
reading of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, that even when the atrocities of the 
slaughterhouse are on display, they are presented in a way that forces the viewer to 
concede that "certain kinds of suffering or deprivation are unavoidable and must be 
accepted in the pursuit of progress or profit" (141). The concern of the Odell family at 
this point is mostly the pursuit of profit; the other interests of the nonhuman animals 
almost disappear.  
Janice is the only one who contemplates the cattle beyond leaving them at the 
stockyards and counting the price per head. Janice's vision of the morbid display on the 
killing floor is thrilling to her because it is a spectacular example of human "pursuit of 
progress." The omission of further mention of the slaughterhouse in Brothers Three 
may also be explained, as Rollin does, in that "few ranchers have ever seen their 
animals slaughtered; even fewer wish to. The vast majority see themselves as stewards 
of land and animals, as living a way of life as well as making a living" (Rollin 55). The 
slaughterhouse, along with the changes in production that created more suffering, was 
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antithetical to the ethic of traditional husbandry techniques and because it was necessary 
for the ranch economy it also disappears from the thoughts of the cattlemen just as it 
did, as Berger notes, from public consciousness. The only subversive narrative to this is 
Mister's reluctance to view the cattle "as objects to be bought, tended, and sold" (198). 
But his objection is lost at the end of the novel when he resolves to take up the lifestyle 
of a rancher again to save the farm. It should be conceded that it is hard to read Mister's 
attempt at coming back to the post-depression farm as promising and easier to see it as 
false hope in this path to individualism. While Oskison’s work contains many of the 
elements that McNickle’s badlands chapter does, it does not readily lend itself to be 
read from the standpoint of first beings. We can, however, understand how the disparate 
elements of Oskison’s figurative and literal use of nonhuman animals show potential for 
this reading when placed alongside The Surrounded. 
The language of domestication prevalent in the political debates over Indigenous 
sovereignty in the mid-1930s is expertly condensed in the badlands chapter of D'Arcy 
McNickle's The Surrounded. As Louis Owens explains, "individuals find themselves 
trapped in a kind of mute isolation" in McNickle’s novel (240). I would only add that 
these individuals are not always human. We can also see that another novel at the time, 
Oskison's Brothers Three, contains potential for bringing the interests of humans and 
nonhumans together. But it is Mister’s adherence to individualism being the solution to 
federal paternalistic policies that prevents such a potential from being fully realized in 
the novel. By reading these texts from the standpoint of first beings, it is evident that the 
racism inherent in the language of Native American domestication and the speciesism 
integral to exploitative practices of domestication of nonhuman animals share the same 
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source. These two texts show us how confinement agriculture and the confinement of 
Native peoples by federal policies are interwoven. We can only understand them fully 
by taking both the figurative and literal readings of domesticated nonhuman animals in 
texts seriously. Reading in such a way also privileges Indigenous ways of understanding 
the world that do not draw a sharp distinction between human and nonhuman beings. 
  
62 
Chapter Three: Sovereign Species: Nonhuman Animals and Cherokee Politics 
In August of 2009, Bob Barker of television game show The Price is Right 
fame, wrote a guest blog for CNN about his attempt to negotiate with the Eastern Band 
Cherokee (EBC) for the release of approximately thirty bears who had been kept at 
roadside zoos on a reservation for the entertainment of tourists (Barker, “LKL Web 
Exclusive”). Barker met with Chief Michell Hicks of the EBC about the bears, but little 
resulted from that meeting. According to Barker, the animals suffer from neglect and 
poor health and are confined to cramped, unadorned concrete cages. Barker explains 
that several people, including PETA investigators, observed the physical mistreatment 
of the bears, including a lack of proper food and the stressful living conditions of these 
nonhuman animals. The bears, the investigators noted, would "pace back and forth, 
walk in endless circles" and exhibit other signs of being under-stimulated and underfed 
(Barker, “LKL Web Exclusive”). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
corroborated these accounts of mistreatment in their investigations. The Associated 
Press reported that in January of 2013, the USDA fined one of the zoos, Chief 
Saunooke Bear Park, $20,000 for its "inhumane conditions" (Weiss). One of the tribal 
council members, Angie Kephart, said about the situation that “Barker and PETA 
should have shown more respect. . . . We are a sovereign nation. We can do what we 
want to” (Johnson). Kephart’s reasoning for continuing the mistreatment of bears for 
tourism relies on the sovereign status of the Eastern Band Cherokee (EBC), yet fails to 
take into account the constraints on that political agency.  
 The situation ostensibly can be understood, following Kephart’s accusation of 
disrespect, as Barker trying to teach Cherokees the error of their ways by—even if 
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unwittingly—playing the role of a white savior. This would certainly not be the first 
time that a “non-Indian,” misguided by narratives of progress, has attempted to change 
the practices of a particular tribe.  More specifically, Native nations have a troubled, 
antagonistic history with animal rights activists. For instance, Lawrence Sampson, a 
spokesperson for the American Indian Movement, explains that while animal rights 
activists protested whale hunting, some employed racist propaganda which caused a 
large increase on assaults toward the Makah and other Natives (6). It is an unfortunate 
reality that disrespect for Native cultures, fueled by progressive ideologies espoused by 
certain animal rights activists, results in increased violence toward Native peoples. 
Thus, in the context of the history of such disrespect and outright bigotry, Kephart’s 
admonition of Barker and PETA is understandable. 
  But what complicates this particular situation is that, Barker is, at least legally, 
an Indian. In his biography, he claims that he is “one-eighth Sioux” and records show 
that he is enrolled in the Sioux Nation (96).
36
 Barker recounts spending his early years 
on the Rosebud Reservation and explains that “it was not uncommon to have Indian 
heritage in those days in that region of the country” (96). Without being privy to 
Barker’s knowledge of Cherokee culture (or his own Sioux heritage, for that matter) or 
his understanding of the complex political history of sovereignty, we can only guess 
how much “respect” Barker showed to Chief Hicks in the private meeting between the 
two. At any rate, Barker’s identification as Indian changes how we can read this 
situation—as intertribal critique. Barker’s blog is, after all, the critique of the Eastern 
Band Cherokee by one Sioux, Bob Barker himself. 
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Barker’s meeting with the chief of the EBC, although unproductive in finding an 
immediate solution, did renew the struggle in the surrounding Cherokee communities to 
free the bears. In an Associated Press article about the controversy, Mitch Weiss 
reported that opposition to the EBC bear zoos is not a new cause in the surrounded 
Cherokee communities. A Cherokee elder Sylvester Crowe, recalled, "some Cherokees 
were against the roadside bear exhibits when they began appearing on the reservation in 
the 1950s." Crowe goes on to say that those protests faded only after being repeatedly 
ignored (Weiss). Two other EBC tribal elders, Amy Walker and Peggy Hill, filed a 
lawsuit to revoke the zoos’ licenses and to secure the release of the bears. Walker 
explained her disgust, saying that “it’s shameful that the Cherokee Bear Zoo is still 
displaying intelligent, sensitive bears in tiny concrete pits” (Weiss). The other plaintiff, 
Peggy Hill, in the same article, explained that the negligent treatment of the bears is 
evident. She says “it’s obvious to anyone who sees them that these bears are suffering, 
and they will continue to suffer every day until they are sent to a sanctuary where 
they’ll finally receive the care they need” (Weiss). Amy Walker explains that the bear 
attractions are antithetical to the Cherokee value to “respect all life” (Weiss). Tribal 
councilwoman Kephart’s claim that the tribal sovereignty justifies the treatment of the 
bears is far less persuasive in light of the disapproval of several EBC citizens and the 
realization of the long history of protest against the zoos. With the weak justification of 
sovereignty given for the treatment of these bears, this controversy allows us an 
opportunity to theorize the possibility of sovereignty being extended beyond the human 
species.  
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 This particular controversy is but one example of the numerous and complex 
interactions between humans and animals in Native cultures; it is one specific tribe 
relating to a small group of the members of one particular nonhuman species. We can 
use this as an example to examine how to understand Native traditional values, such as 
the Cherokee value to “respect all life,” in relation to political discourse. As I argue in 
Chapter Two, the confinement of nonhumans is concomitant with the confinement of 
Native peoples and, as such, the two issues are not easily separated. This entanglement 
is evidenced by the reality that the EBC relies heavily on money from tourists to operate 
in an impoverished and confined reservation. Tourist money aside, I will argue that 
recognizing the sovereignty of the bears by respecting the reality that they are suffering 
may help EBC politics more accurately reflect traditional Cherokee values. 
  If sovereignty can be described, at least in part, as being contingent upon the 
recognition of suffering of a species, nonhuman sovereignty can be recognized and 
acknowledged within Native political discourses. A narrative of ourselves as first 
beings, instead of merely human, can include nonhuman animals in our political 
philosophies and, furthermore, that doing so will strengthen the power of our sovereign 
nations by respecting traditional values. In exploring sovereignty—or political 
agency—as it applies to other animals, Vine Deloria, Jr.’s assertion in We Talk, You 
Listen that suffering predicates sovereignty is important. I argue that a concept of first 
beings is inchoate, but ultimately excluded in the philosophies of two current Native 
political theorists: Taiaiake Alfred and Dale Turner. I further explain that the traditional 
Cherokee story "Origin of Disease and Medicine" recognizes the political agency of 
nonhuman animals and has been put to explicit political use by the Cherokee Nation of 
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Oklahoma. In conclusion, we should recognize the possibility of the nonhuman world 
more generally possessing types of sovereign status. 
 Native theorists have referred to sovereignty most often to signify political 
agency. David E. Wilkins (Lumbee) and K. Tsianina Lomawaima (Creek) provide us 
the clearest definition of a "sovereign nation" as a group that "defines itself and its 
citizens, exercises self-government and the right to treat with other nations, applies its 
jurisdiction over the internal legal affairs of its citizens and sub-parts (such as states), 
claims political jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, and may define certain 
rights that inhere in its citizens" (4). Moreover, they explain that all sovereignty is 
limited in that it contains "constraints," not least of which are "the terms of its treaties 
with other sovereign nations" (5,4). Here we have a definition of sovereignty as political 
agency that is mediated by certain obligations and constraints in relation to other 
sovereign agents. This more practical formulation of the way that sovereign nations 
may exercise power leaves little room for the meaningful involvement of nonhuman 
animals; that is, unless our conceptualization of sovereignty were to involve the 
recognition of other animals as sovereign agents.
37
 
Such explicit, legally-codified formulations of sovereignty, however, rest on 
broader notions of what sovereignty is and how it can be defined within political 
discourses. The multiplicities inherent in the process of defining sovereignty allow us to 
theorize how nonhuman sovereignty can be recognized and acknowledged within 
Indigenous discourses. Many Native theorists are reluctant to pin down broader 
philosophical definitions of the word “sovereignty.” Instead, they would rather 
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concentrate on the ways in which it could be defined strategically. In We Talk, You 
Listen, Vine Deloria, Jr. defines sovereignty first and foremost as a process. Deloria 
writes that "the responsibility which sovereignty creates is oriented primarily toward the 
existence and continuance of the group" (Deloria, We Talk 123). Robert Warrior 
suggests that the reason Deloria evades directly defining sovereignty is because he 
realizes that it is "a process of building community and that process will define the 
future" (91). Deloria recognizes that an optimal definition of sovereignty will need to 
adapt; it should be nimble enough to unite a group in the face of the equally adaptive 
political tactics of oppression. 
 In explaining his reasoning for conceptualizing sovereignty as a process, Deloria 
recounts how in 1969, the “disenchanted white youth” at Woodstock wrongheadedly 
declared themselves a minority. In response to this declaration, in order to differentiate 
how oppressed minorities can be identified outside their declaration of themselves as 
such, Deloria insightfully argues that "implicit in the sufferings of each group is the 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the group" (Deloria, We Talk 117). For example, 
there is, of course, an immense difference when comparing the sum total amount of 
suffering of youth counter-culture in the 60s with the physical and cultural genocides 
experienced by Native nations. Deloria’s point is well-taken in that we should be 
precise about the groups we designate as oppressed because privileged groups may 
appropriate the identity of a minority.  
 Appropriation is a problem for several reasons, but the most severe obstacle it 
creates by the enabling of structural inequalities to persist by masking privilege. It is 
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with this caveat in mind that I argue that nonhuman animals, particularly those who are 
used for food and labor, fit the conceptual category of an oppressed group according to 
Deloria’s criterion of suffering. In terms of nonhuman animals suffering, as Craig 
Womack puts it, “there is no way to escape the fundamental inequity” of human 
relationships with other animals whom we kill for food, or, I add, neglect in service of 
our own ends (such as labor or for tourist attractions). The recognition of nonhuman 
suffering in Native literatures, evident in D’Arcy McNickle’s The Surrounded and John 
M. Oskison’s Brothers Three, calls for the recognition of sovereignty or political 
agency as a logical next step. If we apply Deloria's assertion that suffering predicates 
sovereignty to nonhuman animals, then our recognition of other animals' ability to 
suffer signals an ethical obligation to recognize that they possess sovereignty. We 
should acknowledge that other animals have at the very least a kind of sovereignty. As 
Wilkins and Lomawaima remind us, sovereignty is never free and unfettered, but exists 
with constraints. Our obligation to recognize the sovereignty of nonhuman animals is 
one of the constraints upon our own sovereignty. We should be cognizant and respectful 
of how nonhuman sovereignty limits the power of our own sovereign nations. 
Recognition of the sovereignty of nonhuman animals is already integral to many 
Native traditions and should be to political traditions. As is evidenced in the conflict 
with Makah, however, animal rights activists who misunderstand or dismiss these 
traditions also overlook the political complexity of Native cultures (Nocella and Kahn 
6). The most harmful animal rights ideologies rest on a line of reasoning that has been 
made by scholarly activists. As an example, I would like to focus briefly on an 
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argument by Lisa Kemmerer, who argues against Native hunting traditions. 
Kemmerer’s argument contains threatening implications to Native sovereignty—
implications that her argument does not fully realize.  
In her article titled “Hunting Tradition: Treaties, Law, and Subsistence Killing,” 
Kemmerer posits that current hunting practices carried out by Native peoples should not 
be allowed by the U.S. government because the practices have changed too much to 
qualify as treaty-defined subsistence practices. Her argument rests on the idea that 
traditions must be static, though she herself acknowledges that traditions may change. 
She terms changes “new traditions,” if, for instance, they involve new technology, such 
as hunting with motorized boats (34). These new traditions via technology prove to 
Kemmerer that Native peoples should “abide by all laws regulating hunting, fishing, 
and trapping” by which all other citizens of the United States are legally compelled to 
abide (37).  
What Kemmerer ignores in her analysis is the complex nature of the 
sovereignties recognized by federal treaties and the colonial tactics that have been 
employed against those Native nations. In her characterization of tradition, she 
recognizes (but argues against) Native nations’ sovereign rights to define their own 
hunting traditions. She fails, however, to acknowledge that Native nations also utilize 
their sovereignty to construct the signifier tradition, which, in turn, becomes part of the 
negotiating process with the United States government. Kemmerer assumes that an 
analysis of tradition, which she begins with the Latin root traditio, is sufficient to 
delineate traditions no longer in practice from “new traditions” (32). However, in 
making this claim, she fails to understand Native cultures and political realities on a 
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fundamental level—that is, tradition, like sovereignty, is also a process.  
Furthermore, Kemmerer fails to acknowledge military and assimilationist tactics 
that forced cultural and legal change upon Native nations. She is only somewhat 
persuasive in her use of the objections by Makah tribal elders who protest the 
disrespectful hunting practices of their own tribes. However, her citation of Makah 
elders is outweighed by her insistence upon labeling all Native American peoples as 
“early immigrants” on the premise of the land bridge theory of human migration (1).38 
Kemmerer’s study is helpful, though, in understanding a specific line of inquiry in the 
field of animal studies. This line of inquiry ignores the reality of tribal cultures, the 
multiplicities of sovereignty outside of U.S. federal law, and above all, the far-reaching 
effects of colonization. 
In response to animal advocates such as Kemmerer who misunderstand tribal 
cultures, we should respond with an understanding of ourselves as first beings. This 
provides a way of articulating how sovereignty can include our complex relationships 
with other animals without ignoring the far-reaching effects of colonization. To do this, 
we should rely on those Native traditions that recognize the agency of nonhuman 
animals. As presented in Chapter One, Linda Hogan explains how Native oral 
literatures have always recognized the political agency of other animals by referring to 
treaties to signify our relationships with nonhuman species (10). As also mentioned, 
John Mohawk focuses directly on the political implications of how traditional Native 
American relationships with animals were co-opted by economic motivations. Mohawk 
points out that the inherent rights of other species to exist is a tenet that is broadly held 
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among Native traditionalists. He explains that “it was acceptable to hunt and fish as 
long as the activity did not damage the survivability of the herds or flocks” (20). The 
treatment the EBC condones of the bears in the zoos might be seen as congruent with 
the survivability of the species. However, as Mohawk points out, outspoken Native 
ecologist Ray Fadden explains that in the Northeast, he feels compelled to “feed the 
bears, because there’s not enough for them to eat” (19). Mohawk poignantly writes that 
certain traditions include the belief that “protection and advocacy for the animal nations 
is also a political priority” (22). Mohawk’s use of the term “animal nations,” like 
Hogan’s reference to other animals as people, acknowledges the breadth of traditional 
knowledge that recognizes political agency existing beyond the human species. The 
treatment of the bears in the zoos on the Eastern Band Cherokee reservation cannot be 
easily separated from the plight of bears and other wildlife in the region. Our well-being 
is also not easily separated from the well-being of other animals. 
 We need a more traditional understanding of ourselves as first beings to 
permeate our current political philosophies. Many current Native political philosophers 
have thus far neglected to incorporate into their works a thorough acknowledgment or 
acceptance of those traditions that recognize nonhuman agency. Much scholarship in 
Native studies and Indigenous political philosophy does, however, allude to the 
traditions that value our responsibilities to animals and the rest of the natural world. For 
example, Taiaiake Alfred (Haudenosaunee) and Dale Turner (Temagami) both postulate 
a broad-based intertribal politics while alluding to our relationships with other animals. 
They miss an opportunity, however, to thoroughly integrate traditional relationships 
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with nonhumans into their broader understanding of Native politics. Both theorists 
gesture towards the importance of nonhuman animals, but ultimately their definitions of 
politics rests upon an exclusion of other animals. Despite this shortcoming in their 
arguments, their work has the potential to radically transform our notions of 
sovereignty.  
 In Peace, Power, and Righteousness and This is Not a Peace Pipe, Alfred and 
Turner critique how liberal individualism, predicated on recognizing the individual as 
the basic unit for discourses (judicial, economic, political), overdetermines conceptions 
of sovereignty or, more specifically, how it distorts the way in which sovereignty is 
perceived by paracolonial nation states.
39
 Alfred is critical of the phrase “tribal 
sovereignty,” which he describes as Indians gaining control of “governing structures” 
which he claims are problematically “without a cultural grounding” (3). With cautious 
optimism, he writes that Native nations are in the "first stages of a movement to restore 
autonomous power and cultural integrity in the area of governance" (26).  Alfred sees 
sovereignty as a process—albeit an “uneven” one—“of re-establishing systems that 
promote the goals and reinforce the values of indigenous cultures" (26).  Turner is 
similarly concerned with broadening the idea of “Aboriginal sovereignty,” which he 
argues “in all its diversity is best understood by listening to the myriad voices of 
Aboriginal peoples themselves” (59). Like Deloria, both of these political theorists 
recognize the need for understanding sovereignty as a process of ensuring it is adaptable 
to the political climate of the future. Furthermore, they recognize that this process 
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should allow input from Native peoples and perhaps, most importantly, from 
traditionalists among them. 
 In their critiques, Alfred and Turner attempt to revise static formulations of 
sovereignty belonging to politics proper to reflect more Native-centered philosophical 
concepts. They correctly point out that the American doctrine of individualism is a non-
Native premise superimposed on Native politics through colonial occupation. Both 
replace this misunderstanding with similar interpretations of the basic tenets of the long-
held alliance of tribes known as the Iroquois Confederacy. Alfred and Turner argue that 
man, who above all is a creature of reason, is the basis for the political philosophy of 
this alliance (17, 53). This broader basis for politics recognizes the problems of 
individualism, but does not extend past its anthropocentric foundation. In shifting an 
understanding of sovereignty from a concept based on liberal individualism to one 
based upon reason as the criterion for humanity, they deny agency to the other animals 
who they previously mentioned as important. 
Before I begin to explore how an understanding of ourselves as first beings can 
be usefully applied to Indigenous political philosophies, I want to sketch a quick 
justification for my methodology as it pertains to inter-tribal critique (I am a citizen of 
the Cherokee Nation critiquing Mohawk and other traditions). I believe that to be 
respectful to Native ideas, theories, and texts, we must be critical. This is by no means 
an assumption shared by all critics. However, instead of bringing this conviction to my 
analysis from outside the texts, I want to make the point of the value of critiquing 
tradition from one of the texts themselves. At the end of Alfred’s Peace, Power, and 
Righteousness, transcribed from an answer to an interview question, Alfred says 
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“Indians don’t always think critically about tradition” (165). Alfred continues by 
explaining that lack of critical thinking is the locus where it is imperative that Native 
intellectuals intervene. This same critical stance towards traditionalism is echoed by 
Craig Womack. He writes that “Native intellectual traditions should be subject to harder 
scrutiny than they have been in the past” (Art 111). Tradition, like sovereignty, is a 
process. Part of that process is critique. In being critical of any native text (including 
traditional texts), I intend to respectfully engage with the material rather than to fall into 
the common traps of dismissing its ideas altogether or of treating the work as sacred to 
the point of its being untouchable. I believe that there are more and less respectful ways 
to be critical, and I intend that my analysis and critique to be the former. 
 Alfred makes gestures toward conceptualizing humans as first beings in a 
political sense. He initially acknowledges the importance of our relationships with 
nonhuman animals, explaining that “Native ideas centre on the imperative respectful, 
balanced coexistence among all human, animal, and spirit beings, together with the 
earth” (66). Alfred also acknowledges the heterogeneity of Indigenous ways of knowing 
and then moves very quickly (within the same paragraph) to exploring how we might 
formulate a cohesive “‘Native American’ political tradition” which, among other goals, 
“promotes peaceful coexistence among all elements of creation" (14). Alfred later 
claims that Indigenous traditions lack “western notions of dominion (human and 
natural)” and instead center on “harmony, autonomy, and respect” (29). This echoes 
Jace Weaver’s critique of Christianity postulating the “human being’s divine creation as 
superior” (142). 
 While Alfred’s inclusion of nonhumans is laudable, he does not make altogether 
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clear how they can be enacted. As well, he fails to give any explanation as to how the 
connections to nonhuman animals he describes fit into his overall approach to politics 
more practical than the abstract notions of “harmony, autonomy, and respect.” Still, his 
theory of an inter-tribal tradition that promotes peace among "all elements of creation" 
makes the concept of peace foundational to relationships. Most importantly, in terms of 
my focus here, other animals are not excluded from these peaceful relationships. His 
inclusion of "all human, animal, and spirit beings" provides a platform to investigate 
how nonhuman animal agency might be practically recognized and how it would 
operate within this "peaceful coexistence."  
 After including animals as a group with which a "peaceful coexistence" can be 
realized, Alfred excludes nonhumans in his focus rational human beings. He cites a 
speech by Haudennosaunee historian John Mohawk positing reason as the basic tenet of 
the Iroquois Confederacy. Mohawk says: 
All human beings possess the power of rational thought; all human beings can 
think; all human beings have the same kinds of needs; all human beings want 
what is good for society; all human beings want peace. . . . Out of that idea will 
come the power . . . that will make the people of the [Rotinohshonni] among the 
most influential thinkers in the history of human thought. . . . The basic 
fundamental truth contained in that idea is that so long as we believe that 
everybody in the world has the power to think rationally, we can negotiate with 
them to a position of peace. (As cited in Sioui 47-48) 
 
As Alfred explains in an endnote, he is referencing this speech which was given by 
Mohawk at the University of Buffalo in April, 1985. Alfred misses an opportunity to 
relate this speech to Mohawk’s “Animal Nations,” which would require a political 
philosophy inclusive of nonhumans. He also fails to explain how the foundational tenet 
of reason applies to “all human, animal, and spirit beings” (Alfred 66). 
Alfred’s reliance on rational thought being a human attribute places the agency 
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of nonhuman animals outside of political discourse. He cites the speech as an example 
of Rotinohshonni “oratorical tradition” from a text by Georges E. Sioui (17). What is 
not mentioned is the possible influence of Aristotelian humanism through Jesuit writer 
Joseph-Francois Lafitau (1681-1746) on this Iroquois tradition. Sioui writes that this 
missionary—who lived with both the Wendat and Iroquois—was fascinated by their 
spirituality, philosophies, and tribal council meetings. Lafitau was interested in studying 
Indians because he wanted to make theological arguments about “the innate existence of 
a religious sense in man” (Sioui 47). In his writing on the Iroquois, Sioui also explains 
that Lafitau was “impressed by their confidence [. . .] in the human’s capacity for 
rational thought” (48). Lafitau’s anthropological project indicates a possible influence 
on Iroquois tradition of the rhetorical importance of rational thought as a uniquely 
human attribute. His goal of studying Iroquois was focused on “religious sense” and 
how reason was a universal and unique human attribute. In reading the possibility of 
Lafitau’s influence on Mohawk tradition, I am not arguing that it invalidates rational 
humanism as Mohawk tradition, since reason may be the closest translation for long-
held Mohawk values. I also want to avoid making a facile delineation for possible “new 
traditions” such as Kemmerer proposes in her argument against honoring hunting 
treaties. I do argue, however, that a politics of reason based on human exceptionalism 
fails to recognize the political agency of nonhuman animals. 
 Similar to Alfred, Temagami critic Dale Turner recognizes our obligations to 
nonhuman animals while relying on reason as an ordering concept for broad-based 
intertribal politics. In This is Not a Peace Pipe, Turner also cites the Iroquois 
Confederacy as the prime example for forming a wider Indigenous political philosophy. 
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Regarding our relationships with other animals, he describes a Northwest tribe, the 
Gitxsan people, who envision a world where “the land, the plants, the animals and the 
people all have spirit—they all must be shown respect" (66). Turner notes how the 
"Great Law of Peace" of the Iroquois Confederacy explains this respect in humanistic 
terms.
40
 He writes that "a human being possesses intrinsic value and ought to be 
accorded respect” (49). Turner continues by arguing that “an Iroquoian conception of 
justice centres on the idea that all people can live in peaceful coexistence provided they 
respect the moral autonomy of the other” (53). He expounds that an "Iroquoian 
assumption about human nature is that rational human beings, or those of ‘good mind,’ 
desire peace rather than disorder and war" (53). The concept of a “good mind” and the 
way Mohawk and Alfred use “rational thought” are very similar in their goals—they are 
both looking to construct a political ideology that is concerned with peace as an end 
goal through the instrument of reason.  
 However, as Mohawk reminds us in “Animal Nations,” inherent in Native 
traditions toward nonhuman animals is “a respect not easily described” (20). In an 
endnote, Turner concedes the complexity of the concept of good mind in Iroquoian 
philosophy. He writes that the concept’s “similarity to European ideas of the Good and 
to questions around ‘living the good life’ are interesting and worthy of closer 
examination” (150).41 Including Mohawk’s text on the political agency of other animals 
to the discussion not only complicates Alfred’s use of Mohawk, but also opens the 
possibility for other Haudennosaunee concepts of sovereignty. An inclusion of other 
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animals also falls in line with how Alfred sees sovereignty as the "first stages of a 
movement to restore [our] autonomous power and cultural integrity in the area of 
governance" (26). If, as Mohawk explains, rationality can be the rhetoric that leads to 
“to a position of peace,” it is hard to reconcile this stance with a version of peace that 
stretches outside humanity. Furthermore, focusing primarily on reason leaves little 
space for the political agency of nonhuman animals in the construction of that peace. 
 What both Alfred and Turner might unwittingly impart is that to build a more 
Indigenous-centric definition of sovereignty which would expand respect to the “wider 
community,” as Weaver phrases it, we should rely on Aristotle’s formulation of man as 
a thinking being. Aristotle categorized humans in relation to other animals because the 
Greek philosopher claimed they lacked reason. It is possible that this influence came 
from Lafitau because Jesuit moral philosophy is heavily influenced by Aristotle.
42
 
However, even if it is not Aristotelian influence, the assumption of man as a creature of 
reason is equivalent to the Greek philosopher's stance. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
searches for the categorical element that differentiates humans from animals. In his 
description of the soul, he posits that there is a rational and an irrational part of the soul 
(Smith). Aristotle claims that certain parts of each interact with the others but that the 
rational parts are something that is “peculiarly human” (Smith 60). Reason, per 
Aristotle, is uniquely human.
43
 
 My concern here is that both Alfred and Turner reject the heavy influence of 
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 On Aristotle’s influence on Jesuit moral philosophy, see Simmons. For accounts from 
Jesuits during the time period, see Parkman. 
43
 For a recent reconsideration of Aristotle and nonhuman animals, see Martha 
Nussbaum. 
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liberal humanism on Native sovereignty, but accept a formula analogous to Aristotelian 
humanism. In employing Aristotelian humanism as a base for Indigenous political 
philosophy, the need for a “respectful, balanced coexistence” with other species is 
unrealized (Alfred 66). While Alfred and Turner do not explicitly deny other animals 
the ability to reason, their arguments rest on that assumption. I am not interested in 
arguing here that nonhuman animals have the same (or similar) types of reasoning 
capacities that humans possess.
44
 What I am pointing out is that Alfred and Turner are 
building an inter-tribal political philosophy on the premise of reason, which denies 
animals any degree of agency within political discourse. In effect, they deny 
sovereignty to other species. 
 A more charitable reading of Alfred and Turner with regard to other animals is 
that they are employing human reason as the foundations of politics not only to shift the 
discussion about Indigenous sovereignty away from the doctrine of individualism, but 
also as a corrective to earlier discourses of savagery, or Indians as animalistic. As Roy 
Harvey Pearce writes in Savagism and Civilization, in many settlers’ prejudiced views, 
Indians were “denied their holy, human selves and lived like beasts; they were, in the 
traditional terminology, more animal than rational” (5). Pearce is not alone in pointing 
out this language of animality as applied to Natives. As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
Vine Deloria, Jr. explains how this racist language of Indians as subhuman is strewn 
throughout texts of travel narratives and early anthropological studies (Custer 5).
45
   
 Whether Alfred and Turner use Aristotle rhetorically or employ similar Native 
                                                 
44
 For more on the existence of emotions and moral codes in nonhuman animals, see 
Bekoff and Pierce. 
45
 For more on the idea of the subhuman in relation to colonialism and animal studies, 
  
80 
formulations of man as rational animal, they deny other animals agency. They are both 
exchanging one formulation of a non-Native philosophical system (the autonomous 
individual created by discourses of liberal humanism) for another (the exceptional 
rational human being as proposed by Aristotle); and in doing so, Alfred and Turner shift 
the discourse on sovereignty from a focus on individualism to one centered on reason. 
Besides creating a problem for the inclusion nonhuman agency, the replacing of 
individualism of liberal humanism with Aristotelian humanism is a step in a more 
inclusive direction, and it would prove to be more productive for Native politics were 
only humans a concern. However, one large caveat is that neither of these two authors is 
clear about their definitions of rationality or of who gets to define it. Colonial-controlled 
definitions of rationality pose an immense problem for us as first beings. 
 If resting sovereignty on the foundation of reason fails to recognize the agency 
of other animals, it also threatens the political agency of Native humans. David E. 
Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima clearly map the contentious field of federal law as 
it applies to American Indian nations. At one point, the authors focus on plenary 
powers, contesting one particular type of plenary power exercised by Congress—
absolute power. Wilkins and Lomawaima detail how Supreme Court rulings invoke the 
possibility of these absolute powers and, at the same time, attempt to narrow the 
instances in which they can be applied. One particular case shows how the Court 
attempts to limit the application of absolute plenary powers to rational grounds. In 
Perrin v. Unites States (1914), the Supreme Court decided that these powers should 
only be enacted for the “protection” of tribes. The decision states that “to be effective, 
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[plenary powers’] exercise must not be purely arbitrary, but founded upon some 
reasonable basis” (Wilkins and Lomawaima 114). However, as Wilkins and 
Lomawaima astutely note, “Of course, determining what is ‘arbitrary’ and what is 
‘rational’ is subject entirely to the interpretive power of the justices of the Court, who 
tend to defer to the political branches of the federal government” (114). The definition 
of rationality is subject to "interpretative power" and, in this particular case, it is subject 
to legal interpretation following American political interests.  
 Rationality, as such, is not sufficient as the sole criterion for a politics of first 
beings. As the problems with absolute plenary powers illustrate, it is problematic to 
assume rationality exists without interpretation. Paternalistic U.S. interpretations of 
federal laws toward Native tribes prove that reason is an unstable basis for a broadly 
conceived Native political philosophy. This problem is compounded when rationality is 
evoked to actively limit tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, by arguing that reason is the 
prime criterion for inter-tribal political philosophy, we deny other animals political 
agency. The recognition, rather than the denial, of the sovereignty of nonhuman animals 
can be conceptualized by following my reading of Hogan’s formulation of species 
difference. Following this, we should focus on stories and traditions that define tribal 
community and sovereignty. By focusing on these stories, traditional relationships with 
nonhuman animals can influence Native political philosophy to include the sovereignty 
of other animals. 
 It is with my analysis of Hogan’s formulation of species difference in mind that 
I want to turn to a tribally-specific example of how humanistic definitions of 
sovereignty can be expanded to include other animals. By understanding ourselves as 
  
82 
first beings, we can expand the recognition of human political agency outward. This 
allows us to recognize how traditional narratives have always recognized that 
nonhuman animals possess political agency. To do so, I refer to a Cherokee traditional 
narrative, a story from my own tribe. My analysis of “Origin of Disease and Medicine” 
shows how we, as Cherokees, have narrated our relationships with other animals and 
have thus recognized their political agency. This reading also suggests that we should 
start revising our current formulations of sovereignty so as to include the agency of 
nonhuman animals.
46
 This is only one example of how a traditional narrative can help 
us understand ourselves as first beings. It is also an example of a way forward for 
conceptualizing ourselves as first beings in Native political philosophy. 
This understanding of a political relationship with other animals and a 
recognition of their sovereignty is illustrated in the Cherokee story “Origin of Disease 
and Medicine.” The story explains how human ailments began, along with how humans 
discovered cures for those ailments. Anthropologist James Mooney collected the story 
as one of many Cherokee stories for the U.S. Bureau of American Ethnology in 1887-
88. Mooney gathered or transcribed manuscripts from several Cherokee medicine men 
among the Eastern Band Cherokees and confirmed these narratives with elders in Indian 
Territory, where the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (CNO) now resides. He categorized 
these collected stories as either sacred or secular. The categories of sacred and secular, 
however, are not always separate.
 
A few of the stories concerning nonhuman animals, 
according to Mooney, belong to both categories. Mooney writes that “the shorter animal 
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myths have lost whatever sacred character they once had, and are told now merely as 
humorous explanations of certain animal peculiarities.” He concedes, however, that in 
“rare instances” these animal stories can also be sacred (231). The sacred stories, as 
Mooney categorizes them, belong to a class that includes Cherokee stories of the origin 
of the world. “Origin of Disease and Medicine” is an example of one of these “rare 
instances” in which a story belongs to the categories of both sacred and secular and in 
fact is printed in both Mooney’s Myths of the Cherokees and Sacred Formulas of the 
Cherokees. It is likely that the medicine men whose counsel Mooney sought understood 
the political implications of recounting such a sacred story to Mooney, who was, after 
all, a non-Indian anthropologist employed by the U.S. government.  
 “Origin of Disease and Medicine" can be understood as instituting a recognition 
that animal suffering leads to human suffering and it establishes that recognizing the 
sovereignty of other species is integral to healthier relationships with other animals. The 
story begins with a description of a time when humans and nonhuman animals related to 
each other on much more equal terms than they do now. Due to its importance to my 
analysis and its relative brevity, I will excerpt the full story: 
In the old days quadrupeds, birds, and insects could all talk, and they and 
the human race lived together in peace and friendship. But as time went on the 
people increased so rapidly that their settlements spread over the whole earth 
and the other species found themselves beginning to be cramped for room. This 
was bad enough, but to add to their misfortunes man invented bows, knives, 
blowguns, spears, and hooks, and began to slaughter the larger animals, birds 
and fishes for the sake of their flesh or their skins, while the smaller creatures, 
such as the frog and worms, were crushed and trodden upon without mercy, out 
of pure carelessness or contempt. In this state of affairs the animals resolved to 
consult upon measures for their common safety. 
The bears were the first to meet in council in their townhouses in Kwahi, 
the “Mulberry Place,” and the old White Bear chief presided. After each in turn 
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had made complaint against the way in which man killed their friends, devoured 
their flesh and used their skins for his own adornment, it was unanimously 
decided to begin war at once against the human race. Some one asked what 
weapons man used to accomplish their destruction. “Bows and arrows, of 
course,” cried all the bears in chorus. “And what are they made of?” was the 
next question. “The bow of wood and the string of our own entrails,” replied one 
of the bears. It was then proposed that they make a bow and some arrows and 
see if they could not turn man’s weapons against himself. So one bear got a nice 
piece of locust wood and another sacrificed himself for the good of the rest in 
order to furnish a piece of his entrails for the string. But when everything was 
ready and the first bear stepped up to make the trial it was found that in letting 
the arrow fly after drawing back the bow, his long claws caught the string and 
spoiled the shot. This was annoying, but another suggested that he could 
overcome the difficulty by cutting his claws, which was accordingly done, and 
on a second trial it was found that the arrow went straight to the mark. But here 
the chief, the old White Bear, interposed and said that it was necessary that they 
should have long claws in order to be able to climb trees. “One of us has already 
died to furnish the bow-string, and if we now cut off our claws we shall all have 
to starve together. It is better to trust to the teeth and claws which nature has 
given us, for it is evident that man’s weapons were not intended for us.” 
No one could suggest any better plan, so the old chief dismissed the 
council and the bears dispersed to their forest haunts without having concerted 
any means for preventing the increase of the human race. Had the result of the 
council been otherwise, we should now be at war with the bears, but as it is the 
hunter does not even ask the bear’s pardon when he kills one. 
The deer next held a council under their chief, the Little Deer, and after 
some deliberation resolved to inflict rheumatism upon every hunter who should 
kill one of their number, unless he took care to ask their pardon to the offense. 
They sent notice of their decision to the nearest settlement of Indians and told 
them at the same time how to make propitiation when necessity forced them to 
kill one of the deer tribe. Now, whenever the hunter brings down a deer, the 
Little Deer, who is swift as the wind and can not be wounded, runs quickly up to 
the spot and bending over the blood stains asks the spirit of the deer if it has 
heard the prayer of the hunter for pardon. If the reply be “Yes” all is well and 
the Little Deer goes on his way, but if the reply be in the negative he follows on 
the trail of the hunter, guided by the drops of blood on the ground, until he 
arrives at the cabin in the settlement, when the Little Deer enters invisibly and 
strikes the neglectful hunter with rheumatism, so that he is rendered on the 
instant a helpless cripple. No hunter who has regard for his health ever fails to 
ask pardon of the deer for killing it, although some who have not learned the 
proper formulas may attempt to turn aside the Little Deer from pursuit by 
building a fire behind them in the trail. 
Next came the fishes and reptiles, who had their own grievances against 
humanity. They held a joint council and determined to make their victims dream 
of snakes twining about them in slimy folds and blowing their fetid breath in 
their faces, or to make them dream of eating raw or decaying fish, so that they 
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would lose appetite, sicken, and die. Thus it is that snake and fish dreams are 
accounted for. 
Finally the birds, insects, and smaller animals came together for a like 
purpose, and the Grubworm presided over the deliberations. It was decided that 
each in turn should express an opinion and then vote on the question as to 
whether or not man should be deemed guilty. Seven votes were to be sufficient 
to condemn him. One after another denounced man’s cruelty and injustice 
toward the other animals and voted in favor of his death. The Frog (walasi) 
spoke first and said: “We must do something to check the increase of the race or 
people will become so numerous that we shall be crowded from off the earth. 
See how man has kicked me about because I’m ugly, as he says, until my back is 
covered with sores;” and here he showed the spots on his skin. Next came the 
Bird (tsi’skwa; no particular species is indicated), who condemned man because 
“he burns my feet off,” alluding to the way in which the hunter barbeques birds 
by impaling them on a stick set over the fire, so that their feathers and tender 
feet are singed and burned. Others followed in the same strain. The Ground 
Squirrel alone ventured to say a word in behalf of man, who seldom hurt him 
because he was so small; but this so enraged the others that they fell upon the 
Ground Squirrel and tore him with their teeth and claws, and the stripes remain 
on his back to this day. 
The assembly then began to devise and name various diseases, one after 
another, and had not their invention finally failed them not one of the human 
race would have been able to survive. The Grubworm in his place of honor 
hailed each new malady with delight, until at last they had reached the end of the 
list, when some one suggested that it be arranged so that menstruation should 
sometimes prove fatal to woman. On this he rose up in his place and cried: 
“Wata!” Thanks! I’m glad some of them will die, for they are getting so thick 
that they tread on me.” He fairly shook with joy at the thought, so that he fell 
over backward and could not get up on his feet again, but had to wriggle off on 
his back, as the Grubworm has done ever since.  
When the plants, who were friendly to man, heard what had been done 
by the animals, they determined to defeat their evil designs. Each tree, shrub, 
and herb, down even to the grasses and mosses, agreed to furnish a remedy for 
some one of the diseases named, and each said: “I shall appear to help man 
when he calls upon me in his need.” Thus did medicine originate, and the plants, 
every one of which has its use if we only knew it, furnish the antidote to 
counteract the evil wrought by the vengeful animals. When the doctor is in 
doubt what treatment to apply for the relief of a patient, the spirit of the plant 
suggests to him the proper remedy. (Mooney 319-22) 
 
Some might characterize the use of nonhuman animals in this story as anthropomorphic, 
as many Native animal stories are understood; this particular story, however, proves too 
complex an example for such a dismissive reading. Clearly, we would also be mistaken 
  
86 
to read this somber narrative as one of the “humorous explanations” of animal behavior. 
It does, however, include small elements of such stories, such as when it explains the 
reason for stripes on the backs of ground squirrels and why the grubworm “wiggles off 
on his back” (Mooney 321). However, these examples are overshadowed by the way the 
story articulates the valid concern of various species in avoiding suffering caused by 
humans. Therefore, it is vital to recognize the political importance of this story as it 
applies to human relationships with other sentient species. Indeed, the political 
importance of “Origin of Disease and Medicine” is evident, as it is a traditional example 
of how we as Cherokees have narrated our relationships with other animals. The 
assertion that nonhuman animals and humans “lived together in peace and friendship” 
characterizes an ideal ethics of our relationships with other animals – here, an obligation 
on our part to minimize suffering. Such ethics include, at the very least, an obligation to 
avoid killing nonhuman animals to the point of extinction or “out of pure carelessness 
or contempt.” This ideal can and should extend to our treatment of other animals more 
generally. 
 The first part of the narrative establishes that Cherokees do have an existing 
political relationship—or treaty, as Hogan terms it—with nonhuman animals. The story 
continues by explaining that this ideal relationship was compromised by the problem of 
human greed. Humans began to kill other animals not solely for sustenance, but to trade 
their hides, which led the various animal tribes to form a council to “begin war at once 
against the human race” (320). As part of their tactics in this war, the animal tribes 
created diseases for humans, including “rheumatism” and infected dreams to make 
humans “lose appetite, sicken, and die” (321). To avoid these afflictions, the story 
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explains, hunters are required to ask for forgiveness from the animal who has been 
killed. If the hunter fails to do this, the spirit of the animal will afflict the hunter with a 
particular disease.
2
 
 This traditional narrative serves as a warning against transgressing treaties with 
nonhuman animals by hunting in an ethical way. However, this story also establishes an 
ethical baseline for the treatment and killing of other animals. While praying for an 
animal after death does not alleviate its suffering (from a secular standpoint), it may 
help to create a culture of hunting that is more mindful of the suffering of nonhuman 
animals while they are alive. “Origin of Disease and Medicine” enunciates a concern for 
how other species use the power of disease to avoid suffering due to carelessness and 
the inevitabilities of human overpopulation, or “settlements spread over the whole 
earth.” At the council meeting with the other animal tribes, the Frog, who leads the 
meeting entreats, “We must do something to check the increase of the race or people 
will become so numerous that we shall be crowded from the earth” (Mooney 321). The 
solution for the nonhuman animals of this story to avoid suffering and extinction is to 
use their powers to create diseases for man. This traditional Cherokee story, with its 
figurative use of other animals carefully understood, clearly recognizes the suffering of 
nonhuman animals being hunted for sport or profit. With several types of species given 
voice in the story, it is proper to include all sentient animals in the formulation of those 
who are recognized as having power and exercising it. Those beings who can suffer, 
according to this Cherokee narrative, should not suffer without apology. 
“Origin of Disease and Medicine” has also been referenced recently within a 
Cherokee political text, suggesting that it has importance both culturally and politically. 
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In 2002, officials of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma included a shortened version of 
this story in a political document titled “Disease and Genocide.” The document, 
authored by former chief Chad Smith and former deputy chief Hastings Shade, was part 
of a more comprehensive manuscript titled Declaration of Designed Purpose meant to 
elucidate the political philosophy of the Smith administration. Smith and Shade 
summarize “Origin of Disease and Medicine” by writing that 
From the beginning, there had been an agreement between the Cherokees and 
the animals that the animals would sacrifice some of their own to sustain the 
Cherokee people, provided the people took no more than they needed to live, 
and provided they showed the proper honor and respect to the animal at the time 
of the kill. For many generations, the Cherokees had abided by this agreement as 
they hunted the animals, and the animals had given their lives without 
remonstrance. 
Smith and Shade continue by explaining how the demand for European goods caused 
the over-hunting of deer in particular. According to the authors, this practice predicated 
a plague of smallpox in 1738 that killed half of the tribe and another wave of the disease 
forty years later that killed another third of the Cherokee population. Smith and Shade 
go on to explain that the plague was followed by failed political alliances with the 
French and British. All these factors, Smith and Shade claim, led to a weakened and 
thereby increasingly centralized Cherokee governmental structure. The formation of a 
unified governing body occurred in response to a tribe that could not battle against the 
genocidal agenda of the burgeoning United States in the eighteenth century (Smith and 
Shade). 
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 It is clear here that Smith and Shade are arguing that relationships with 
nonhuman animals maintained by Cherokees changed with European contact. They also 
posit that this change predicated diseases, specifically smallpox, which led to the 
Cherokees' inability to defend themselves in war with the invading colonists. As Jared 
Diamond explains in his popular history of colonization and inequality, European germs 
played a decisive role against the political resistance of Native American tribes. 
Diamond writes that “diseases introduced with Europeans spread from tribe to tribe far 
in advance of the Europeans themselves, killing an estimated 95 percent of the pre-
Columbian Native American population” (78). The introduction of unknown diseases 
traveled along trade routes between Europeans and Native American tribes and it also 
also spread among tribes faster than the “Europeans themselves” with devastating 
effect.  
 “Origin of Disease and Medicine” is a prescient warning against future 
mistreatment of other animals. The origins of many of the most devastating human 
diseases, including smallpox, are unknown. The Center for Disease Control claims that 
“smallpox is not known to be transmitted by insects or animals.” However, a recent 
scientific study suggests that smallpox was likely mutated from a pathogen originally 
present in domesticated nonhuman animals (Wolfe, Dunavan & Diamond 279). 
Domesticating nonhuman animals, something not done on a large scale in the Americas 
pre-Columbus, likely allowed the disease originally to mutate. And, as the authors of 
the scientific study readily concede, most human diseases originate in nonhuman 
animals particularly in regions where domestication became a common practice very 
early. 
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 Smith and Shade construct this political document, “Disease and Genocide,” to 
demonstrate how a change in relationships with other animals led to several 
autonomous Cherokee towns consolidating into a nation. Rather than overhunting, 
however, a difference in the prevalence of domestication, keeping nonhuman animals in 
greater numbers and increasingly confined spaces, likely led to the mutation of 
smallpox and other diseases deadly to humans. Smallpox, and other diseases, spread to 
Cherokees and other tribes with increasing contact from those newly arrived to the 
Americas. In this political document, Smith and Shade allude to a non-Indian way of 
conceptualizing human relationships with other animals. An increase in domestication 
led to the susceptibility of Cherokees to the diseases from settlers and eventually 
contributed to American campaigns of confinement and genocide. This was because for 
eighteenth-century Cherokees, as Smith and Shade write, “the balance of their world 
was gone.” A lack of balance in relationships with nonhuman animals, as the authors 
argue, was partly responsible for the consolidations of autonomous towns into a 
centralized Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (CNO).  
 Declaration of Designed Purpose, of which “Disease and Genocide” was 
excerpted for the CNO website, was published the same year the Oklahoma Water 
Resources Board took steps to study pollution in scenic rivers of Oklahoma. These 
studies provided evidence of phosphates from Arkansas poultry farms which polluted 
water sources, such as the Illinois River, within the borders of Oklahoma and the CNO. 
The lawsuit was filed by the state of Oklahoma against Tyson and eleven other large 
poultry companies in September of 2009. CNO attempted to join the state of Oklahoma 
in this lawsuit to protect the Illinois River from pollution produced by the waste created 
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by the large poultry farming operations. Federal courts denied CNO entry into the 
lawsuit and also denied it upon appeal (Chavez). By attempting to join this lawsuit, the 
CNO demonstrated a common grievance with the state of Oklahoma. Both the CNO and 
Oklahoma attempted to seek damages from the poorly regulated, or unbalanced, poultry 
companies in Arkansas.  
 The CNO, in its attempt to join the lawsuit, asserted its sovereign right to 
"preserve the watershed for cultural, religious and recreational usage" (Chavez). The 
balance of phosphates in CNO watershed was compromised by poultry operations. 
Smith and Shade’s focus on the imbalance of our relationships with other animals. This 
focus allows “Origin of Disease and Medicine,” which is alluded to in “Disease and 
Genocide,” to operate politically. Had the CNO not been denied as plaintiff, this 
allusion would have positioned the CNO strategically against Tyson and the other 
poultry companies. It would have allowed the CNO grounds to claim the Arkansas 
poultry companies had transgressed Cherokee sovereignty. This transgression would 
have been more than additional phosphates to a water resource, but more broadly, an 
offense to Cherokee cultural and traditional values.  
 In using a version of “Origin of Disease and Medicine” to assert their 
sovereignty, the CNO also implicitly recognized the disrespect and suffering, and as 
Deloria would have it, the sovereignty of other animals, such as chickens in these large 
poultry companies. The large-scale poultry operations not only pose a danger to the 
environment (and sovereign control over water sources), but induce more suffering in 
the nonhuman animals themselves than other methods of farming or hunting. As Annie 
Potts explains in her history of the species Gallus Gallus, chickens raised for 
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consumption in large operations such as Tyson suffer acutely and en masse, 8-10 billion 
a year in America alone (139). Standard breeding practices which privilege weight gain 
above all else lead to “up to 30 percent suffer[ing] severe lameness and swelling, and at 
least that many suffer[ing] chronic pain” (155). Even chickens kept for egg-laying live 
under “constrained conditions” that, in most instance, do not allow them to turn around 
(Potts 160). The overcrowded conditions of these chickens are responsible for sickness 
and death of many of these nonhuman animals by way of “extreme suffering” of the 
species “at every stage of processing prior to slaughter” (167). Since, as Potts writes, 
the Animal Welfare Act and Humane Slaughter Act disregards chickens, it is 
noteworthy that the CNO implicitly recognizes the suffering of that species, especially 
since that suffering leads to human disease. 
 The imbalance in the U.S. poultry industry, which the CNO political document 
“Disease and Genocide” critiques, is caused by disregard for the suffering of chickens 
and disregard for the pollution and disease created by such farming practices. In 1998, 
Tyson was sued for contributing “coliform bacteria, phosphorous and nitrogen” to water 
sources in Maryland (Potts 170). The pollution of local rivers and the possibility of new 
diseases suffered by humans and other animals are the unfortunate but likely outcome 
of this disregard for the suffering of other animals and a disregard for ecological 
balance which “Origin of Disease and Medicine” clearly warns against. These lessons 
taught by traditional Native stories about nonhuman animals can help us consider the 
possibility of more balanced relationships with other species. These more balanced 
relationships can recognize the ethical, ecological, and political importance of how we 
treat them. 
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 We should take seriously Hogan’s claim of treaties with nonhuman species in 
our traditional stories through our recognition of their political agency. “Origin of 
Disease and Medicine” is one such tribally specific example. In this story, we are 
compelled to recognize the suffering of other animals. In addition, this narrative allows 
us to theorize the possibility of nonhuman sovereignty. Theorizing sovereignty in this 
way comes closer to an understanding of ourselves as first beings—different, but not 
categorically so. The beginnings of our recognition of nonhuman agency is already 
evident (if incomplete) in Native political philosophies, as shown through Alfred and 
Turner. If we allow our politics to reflect the respect afforded to nonhuman animals that 
is prevalent in our traditional stories, we will understand more clearly that the 
constraints on sovereignty need not be restricted to the human species. 
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Conclusion 
 My critique in this study of how Native American literatures, and therefore 
Native cultures, recognize the political agency of nonhuman animals only scratches the 
surface of a much larger group of relevant literature. One notable novel not mentioned 
in this study, for example, is N. Scott Momaday's The Ancient Child. This novel 
sustains a fair amount of focus on the relationship between the protagonist, Grey, and 
her horse. But this is only one of the many examples of Native texts that have the 
potential to complicate our understanding of the relationships between humans and 
nonhuman animals. There are so many examples, in fact, that a comprehensive study 
would be improbable at best. One way to productively move forward, given the number 
of examples, is to look at tribally-specific ways of understanding our relationships with 
other animals. I begin this approach in Chapter Three, where I argue that we can 
recognize a tribally-specific Cherokee understanding of the political agency of 
nonhuman animals. These texts that narrate our relationships with other animals include 
not only Native literature in the restrictive sense (novels, short stories, and poetry) but 
Indigenous art, philosophies, spiritual practices, and other products of Indigenous 
cultures. Furthermore, focusing on political agency and suffering as I have in this study 
is only one of many potential ways of understanding ourselves in relation to other 
animals and of understanding nonhuman animals in relation to us. With all of this in 
mind, I hope that my study is only another step in the critical exploration of the many 
and complex relationships between humans and nonhuman animals to be found in 
Native cultures. 
 My examination of human and nonhuman relationships in Native literatures may 
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be expanded even further by thinking about how Native literatures (in the broad and 
narrow senses) echo how Native cultures relate to the nonhuman world more generally; 
that is, how Native literatures depict the importance of relationships with beings both 
living and nonliving. An excellent example of this broader examination can be found in 
Carter Revard’s (Osage) latest book of poetry From the Extinct Volcano, a Bird of 
Paradise. In this collection, Revard focuses on singing as the main tool for cultural 
survival. As he stresses in his introduction, the act of singing, and thereby the 
possibility of perpetuating culture, is not something that is confined to the human 
species. He includes poems that pay close attention to the songs and behaviors of 
several species such as drumming deer mice and the songs of several birds (including 
the wine-throated hummingbird), diligent dung beetles, egg-eating blacksnakes, and 
opportunistic chiggers. However, Revard also includes beings that we do not typically 
think of as living. This is evidenced by the poem "Geode.” This poem is narrated from 
the point of view of the geological structure on its journey from the bottom of the ocean 
to ultimately end up as bookends on the shelf. In thinking of ourselves as first beings 
and paying attention to the common interests we share with nonhuman animals there is 
potential, as Revard shows us, for an expanded understanding of our own indigeneity in 
relation to the nonliving world. Rather than understanding ourselves as separate and 
above the nonhuman world we should come to the realization that we have always been 
interconnected with it, as one of many types of beings. 
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